Diff: Runtime Specification

@@ -1,10 +1,33 @@
1	1	<div style="font-size: 0.85em; color: #656d76; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0.5em; background: #f6f8fa; border-radius: 4px;">
2		-📄 Source: <a href="https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/e6e5db26702ee88d530d2789ac87749472a6641c/runtime/README.md" target="_blank">chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/runtime/README.md</a> @ <code>e6e5db2</code>
	2	+📄 Source: <a href="https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/e56467181b5313e53cf6cdc92f705a4127480fc2/runtime/README.md" target="_blank">chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/runtime/README.md</a> @ <code>e564671</code>
3	3	</div>
4	4
5		-# Caliptra Runtime Firmware v1.1
	5	+# Caliptra Runtime Firmware v2.0.1
	6	+
	7	+Spec version: 0.3
6	8
7	9	This specification describes the Caliptra Runtime Firmware.
	10	+
	11	+## Changelog
	12	+
	13	+v1.1:
	14	+
	15	+* [LMS Signature Verification](#lms_signature_verify-new-in-11)
	16	+
	17	+v1.2:
	18	+
	19	+* [Manifest-Based Image Authorization](#manifest-based-image-authorization-new-in-12)
	20	+
	21	+v2.0:
	22	+
	23	+* Add support for passive mode (same as 1.x) and subsystem (or active) mode
	24	+* [MCU Runtime loading](#boot-and-initialization) (subsystem mode)
	25	+* [Cryptographic mailbox commands](#cryptographic-mailbox-commands-new-in-20)
	26	+* `ECDSA384_SIGNATURE_VERIFY` and `LMS_SIGNATURE_VERIFY`require the hash to be included in the message, as the SHA accelerator registers are no longer accessible outside Caliptra.
	27	+
	28	+## Spec Opens
	29	+
	30	+* Cryptographic Mailbox: ML-KEM support
8	31
9	32	## Runtime Firmware environment
10	33
@@ -16,11 +39,11 @@
16	39
17	40	* Initialize the [DICE Protection Environment (DPE)](#dice-protection-environment-dpe)
18	41	* Initialize any SRAM structures used by Runtime Firmware
	42	+* Upload the firwmare to the Manufacturer Control Unit (2.0, susbystem mode only)
19	43
20	44	For behavior during other types of reset, see [Runtime firmware updates](#runtime-firmware-updates).
21	45
22		-If Runtime Firmware detects that Caliptra was reset during the execution of an operation, Runtime Firmware calls `DISABLE_ATTESTATION` because the internal state of Caliptra may
23		-be corrupted.
	46	+If Runtime Firmware detects that Caliptra was reset during the execution of an operation, Runtime Firmware calls `DISABLE_ATTESTATION` because the internal state of Caliptra may be corrupted.
24	47
25	48	### Main loop
26	49
@@ -62,7 +85,98 @@
62	85	possible; however, it will have its own copies of all of these drivers linked into
63	86	the Runtime Firmware binary.
64	87
65		-## Manifest-Based Image Authorization (new in 1.2)
	88	+## Cryptographic Mailbox Commands (new in 2.0)
	89	+
	90	+Cryptographic mailbox (CM) commands are a flexible set of mailbox commands that provide access to Caliptra's cryptographic cabilities.
	91	+This is meant for offloaded key storage and use, supporting protocols like SPDM and OCP LOCK.
	92	+
	93	+These commands are not meant to be high-performance as they are accessed via mailbox commands.
	94	+
	95	+CM itself does not provide any storage for the keys: when generated, they are returned to the caller in encrypted form, and must be passed back to be used.
	96	+
	97	+These mailbox commands provide SHA, HMAC, HKDF, AES, RNG, MLDSA, and ECDSA services.
	98	+
	99	+Note that while MLDSA and ECDSA keys can be imported, generated, and used in the cryptographic mailbox commands (i.e., `CM_` commands) through CMKs, these keys are NOT* tied DICE or DPE, so their use may be restricted for certain purposes.
	100	+
	101	+MLDSA and ECDSA keys managed by DPE use the separate `ECDSA384_SIGNATURE_VERIFY`, `LMS_SIGNATURE_VERIFY`, and `MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_VERIFY` mailbox commands, which do not use the cryptographic mailbox system and are not managed by CMKs.
	102	+
	103	+
	104	+### References
	105	+
	106	+* [SPDM 1.3.1 (DSP0274)](https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP0274_1.3.1.pdf), dated 2024-07-01.
	107	+* [OCP Attestation v1.1](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1wA0hbJdtCpcQ1NvsVsYr2IeCkwQbgC7e/edit)
	108	+* [RFC 5869 (HKDF)](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869.html)
	109	+* [RFC 8446](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446) Section 7.4.2 & IEEE 1363 (TLS ECDH secret derivation)
	110	+
	111	+### Contexts
	112	+
	113	+Several of the methods, such as SHA and AES, support contexts so that multiple users can have in-flight requests at the same time.
	114	+
	115	+The contexts contain the internal structures necessary to resume operations to support data that may exceed the size of a single mailbox command.
	116	+
	117	+These contexts are intended to be opaque to the user, and SHALL be encrypted and authenticated if they contain sensitive internal data.
	118	+
	119	+### Keys
	120	+
	121	+Cryptographic Mailbox Key (CMKs) are used to store keys. Certain commands generate and return a new CMK. Most commands that use CMKs will also return a new CMK, as it is necessary to track CMKs so that they are not used beyond any relevant limits for their key type.
	122	+
	123	+They are returned from commands that generate keys and must be passed back to Caliptra to be used. These keys are encrypted and opaque to the mailbox caller.
	124	+
	125	+Internally, the unecrypted CMKs have the following structure:
	126	+
	127	+\| Name \| Bits \| Description \|
	128	+\| ------------- \| -------- \| -------------------------------------- \|
	129	+\| version \| 8 \| CMK version. Currently always 1. \|
	130	+\| flags \| 8 \| Bit 0 = FIPS valid \|
	131	+\| length \| 16 \| how many bits of key material are used \|
	132	+\| key usage \| 8 \| represents which kind of key this is \|
	133	+\| id \| 24 \| ID number \|
	134	+\| usage counter \| 64 \| how many times this key has been used \|
	135	+\|\|\| This MAY only be tracked for AES keys \|
	136	+\| key material \| 512 \| bits used for the key material \|
	137	+
	138	+
	139	+The encrypted CMKs have the structure:
	140	+
	141	+\| Name \| Bits \| Description \|
	142	+\| --------------- \| -------- \| ------------------------------ \|
	143	+\| domain \| 32 \| reserved \|
	144	+\| domain metadata \| 128 \| reserved \|
	145	+\| iv \| 96 \|\|
	146	+\| ciphertext \| 640 \| encrypted CMK data (see above) \|
	147	+\| GCM tag \| 128 \|\|
	148	+
	149	+
	150	+The total size of the CMK is therefore 128 bytes.
	151	+
	152	+Only the encrypted CMKs will appear in mailbox messages.
	153	+
	154	+The key used to encrypt the CMKs is randomized on reset, which means that CMKs cannot be used between resets.
	155	+The IV is a randomized 1-up counter that is incremented for every key created.
	156	+
	157	+#### Key Usage
	158	+
	159	+The internal CMK structure and several commands use a key usage tag to specify how a key can be used:
	160	+
	161	+\| Value \| Usage \|
	162	+\| --------- \| --------- \|
	163	+\| 0 \| Reserved \|
	164	+\| 1 \| HMAC \|
	165	+\| 2 \| HKDF \|
	166	+\| 3 \| AES \|
	167	+
	168	+
	169	+#### Replay Prevention and Deletion
	170	+
	171	+To prevent replay attacks, Caliptra will have a small table that maps a CMK's internal ID to its last known usage counters.
	172	+Whenever a CMK is used, this table is checked and updated.
	173	+
	174	+This is necessary for AES-256-GCM in particular to ensure that keys are only used a certain number of times, as per [NIST SP 800-38D, Section 8.3](https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D).
	175	+Only AES-256-GCM keys need to be tracked in this table, but other keys MAY be tracked as well.
	176	+
	177	+This requires 96 bits of storage per AES-256-GCM key. These can stored as a sorted list in the DCCM.
	178	+
	179	+## Manifest-Based Image Authorization
66	180
67	181	Caliptra's goal is to enable integrators to meet standard security requirements for creating cryptographic identity and securely reporting measurements through DICE and DPE Certificate chains and Caliptra-owned private-public key pairs. In addition, Caliptra 1.0 provides an `ECDSA384_SIGNATURE_VERIFY` command to enable an SoC RoT to verify its own FW signatures so that it can develop an SoC secure boot using Caliptra cryptography. Caliptra 1.1 expanded the verify command to a PQC-safe `LMS_SIGNATURE_VERIFY` command. In each of these cases, it is left up to the vendor to ensure that they build a secure environment for introducing and verifying FW integrity and authenticity and then executing mutable FW.
68	182
@@ -73,7 +187,7 @@
73	187
74	188	Each of these abilities are tied to Caliptra Vendor and Owner FW signing keys and should be independent of any SoC RoT FW signing keys.
75	189
76		-Manifest-based image authorization is implemented via two mailbox commands: [`SET_AUTH_MANIFEST`](#set-auth-manifest) and [`AUTHORIZE_AND_STASH`](#authorize-and-stash). For image format of the manifest, please refer [this file](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/e6e5db26702ee88d530d2789ac87749472a6641c/auth-manifest/README.md).
	190	+Manifest-based image authorization is implemented via two mailbox commands: [`SET_AUTH_MANIFEST`](#set-auth-manifest), and [`AUTHORIZE_AND_STASH`](#authorize-and-stash).
77	191
78	192	### Caliptra-Endorsed Aggregated Measured Boot
79	193
@@ -85,7 +199,7 @@
85	199
86	200	The Caliptra-Endorsed Local Verifier could be required by the owner only or both the vendor and the owner.
87	201
88		-The main difference between Caliptra-Endorsed Aggregated Measured Boot and Caliptra-Endorsed Local Verifier is whether the SoC RoT is relying on the Measurement Manifest for SoC Secure Boot services as opposed to using it as an additional verification.
	202	+The main difference between Caliptra-Endorsed Aggregated Measured Boot and Caliptra-Endorsed Local Verifier is if the SoC RoT is relying on the Measurement Manifest for SoC Secure Boot services as opposed as using it as an additional verification.
89	203
90	204	### SoC RoT Enforcement of Measurement Manifest
91	205
@@ -97,24 +211,24 @@
97	211
98	212	### Unique Measurement Manifest Signing Keys
99	213
100		-In order to reduce usage of the Caliptra FW Signing keys, the measurement manifest will be signed by new key pairs: one for the owner and optionally one for the vendor. These new key pairs are endorsed once by the Caliptra FW signing keys, the signature being in the Measurement Manifest, thus allowing the measurement manifest keys to be used independently of the Caliptra FW signing keys.
	214	+In order to reduce usage of the Caliptra FW Signing keys, the measurement manifest will be signed by new key pairs: one for the owner and possibly one for the vendor. These new key pairs are endorsed once using a single signature within the Measurement Manifest, thus allowing the measurement manifest keys to be used independently of the Caliptra FW signing keys.
101	215
102	216	### Caliptra Measurement Manifest Vendor Public Key Authenticity
103	217
104	218	The Measurement Manifest MUST have an endorsement by the Caliptra Vendor Public Key. In order to fulfill this requirement, the Vendor has 2 options:
105	219
106		-* Vendor signing of `Image Metadata Collection` required: The Vendor creates a new Measurement keypair which will sign the measurement manifest and endorses this new public key with the Caliptra FW Vendor Private Key. The signature covers both the new public key as well as the flags field which indicates that the new Measurement Key Pair will be enforced.
107		-* Vendor signing of `Image Metadata Collection` not required: Vendor leaves the Vendor public key as all zeros, and clears the flag which enforces vendor signing and then endorses these fields with a signature in the Measurement Manifest. In this case, the Vendor releases ownership of enforcing any specific FW in execution.
	220	+* Vendor signing required: The Vendor creates a new Measurement keypair which will sign the measurement manifest and endorses the new public key with the Caliptra FW Vendor Private Key. The signature covers both the new public key as well as the flags field which indicates that the new Measurement Key Pair will be enforced.
	221	+* Vendor signing not required: Vendor leaves the Vendor public key as all zeros, and clears the flag which enforces vendor signing and then endorses these fields with a signature in the Measurement Manifest. In this case, the Vendor releases ownership of enforcing any specific FW in execution.
108	222
109	223	### Caliptra Measurement Manifest Owner Public Key Authenticity
110	224
111	225	Caliptra will always verify the endorsement of the Measurement Manifest Owner Public key and require that it signed the measurement manifest.
112	226
113		-This feature is accomplished by having the SoC send a manifest to Caliptra Runtime through the `SET_AUTH_MANIFEST` mailbox command. The manifest will include a set of hashes for the different SoC images. Later, the SOC will ask for authorization for its images from the Caliptra Runtime through the `AUTHORIZE_AND_STASH` new mailbox command. Caliptra Runtime will authorize the image based on whether its hash was contained in the manifest.
	227	+This feature is accomplished by having the SoC send a manifest to Caliptra Runtime through the `SET_AUTH_MANIFEST` mailbox command. The manifest will include a set of hashes for the different SoC images. Later, the SOC will ask for authorization for its images from the Caliptra Runtime through the `AUTHORIZE_AND_STASH` new mailbox commands. Caliptra Runtime will authorize the image based on whether its hash was contained in the manifest.
114	228
115	229	#### Preamble
116	230
117		-The manifest begins with the Preamble section, which contains new manifest ECC and LMS public keys of the vendor and the owner. These public keys correspond to the private keys that sign the Image Metadata Collection (IMC) section. These signatures are included in the Preamble. The Caliptra firmware's private keys endorse the manifest's public keys and these endorsements (i.e., signatures) are part of the Preamble as well.
	231	+The manifest begins with the Preamble section, which contains new manifest ECC and either MLDSA or LMS public keys of the vendor and the owner. These public keys correspond to the private keys that sign the Image Metadata Collection (IMC) section. These signatures are included in the Preamble. The Caliptra firmware's private keys endorse the manifest's public keys and these endorsements (i.e., signatures) are part of the Preamble as well.
118	232
119	233	#### Image Metadata Collection (IMC)
120	234
@@ -133,6 +247,10 @@
133	247	* If the owner endorsement is invalid, the `SET_AUTH_MANIFEST` command will be rejected.
134	248	* Otherwise, the owner public key will be trusted and Caliptra will use it to verify the overall measurement manifest.
135	249
	250	+#### Measurement Manifest Version Number
	251	+
	252	+A Measurement Manifest VN is used to ensure that some enforcement is possible if a progression of measurements is required. 32 bits of the existing unused `IDEVID_MANUF_IDENTIFIER` fuse (128 bits) can be repurposed for this. This can be accomplished by updating Caliptra's main specification to redefine the fuse definition and its usage from "Programming time" to "Field Programmable".
	253	+
136	254	### Image Authorization Sequence
137	255
138	256	The diagram below illustrates how this feature is part of the Caliptra boot flow, and the order of operations needed to use the feature.
@@ -143,7 +261,7 @@
143	261	FMC->>Runtime: Launch RT
144	262	Runtime->>SOC: RDY_FOR_RT
145	263	Note over Runtime,SOC: Manifest Load
146		- SOC->>Runtime: SET_AUTH_MANIFEST
	264	+ SOC->>Runtime: SET_MANIFEST
147	265	Runtime-->>SOC: Success/Failure
148	266	Note over Runtime,SOC: Image Authorization
149	267	loop n times
@@ -161,14 +279,19 @@
161	279
162	280	Table: Mailbox command result codes
163	281
164		-\| Name \| Value \| Description
165		-\| ------- \| ----- \| -----------
166		-\| `SUCCESS` \| `0x0000_0000` \| Mailbox command succeeded
167		-\| `BAD_VENDOR_SIG` \| `0x5653_4947` ("VSIG") \| Vendor signature check failed
168		-\| `BAD_OWNER_SIG` \| `0x4F53_4947` ("OSIG") \| Owner signature check failed
169		-\| `BAD_SIG` \| `0x4253_4947` ("BSIG") \| Generic signature check failure (for crypto offload)
170		-\| `BAD_IMAGE` \| `0x4249_4D47` ("BIMG") \| Malformed input image
171		-\| `BAD_CHKSUM` \| `0x4243_484B` ("BCHK") \| Checksum check failed on input arguments
	282	+\| Name \| Value \| Description \|
	283	+\| ---------------- \| ---------------------- \| ---------------------------------------------------- \|
	284	+\| `SUCCESS` \| `0x0000_0000` \| Mailbox command succeeded \|
	285	+\| `BAD_VENDOR_SIG` \| `0x5653_4947` ("VSIG") \| Vendor signature check failed \|
	286	+\| `BAD_OWNER_SIG` \| `0x4F53_4947` ("OSIG") \| Owner signature check failed \|
	287	+\| `BAD_SIG` \| `0x4253_4947` ("BSIG") \| Generic signature check failure (for crypto offload) \|
	288	+\| `BAD_IMAGE` \| `0x4249_4D47` ("BIMG") \| Malformed input image \|
	289	+\| `BAD_CHKSUM` \| `0x4243_484B` ("BCHK") \| Checksum check failed on input arguments \|
	290	+\| `CME_BAD_CMK` \| `0x434D_424B` ("CMBK") \| Invalid CMK \|
	291	+\| `CME_CMK_OFLW` \| `0x434D_424F` ("CMBO") \| CMK has been used too many times \|
	292	+\| `CME_BAD_CTXT` \| `0x434D_4243` ("CMBC") \| Bad context \|
	293	+\| `CME_FULL` \| `0x434D_4546` ("CMEF") \| Too many Cryptographic Mailbox usage counters in use \|
	294	+
172	295
173	296	Relevant registers:
174	297
@@ -177,30 +300,54 @@
177	300	* CPTRA\_FW\_ERROR\_NON\_FATAL: Status code of mailbox command. Any result
178	301	other than `SUCCESS` signifies a mailbox command failure.
179	302
180		-### CALIPTRA\_FW\_LOAD
181		-
182		-The `CALIPTRA_FW_LOAD` command is handled by both ROM and Runtime Firmware.
	303	+Mailbox user 0xFFFF_FFFF is reserved for Caliptra internal use. All mailbox
	304	+commands from that user will fail.
	305	+
	306	+### FW\_LOAD
	307	+
	308	+The `FIRMWARE_LOAD` command is handled by both ROM and Runtime Firmware.
183	309
184	310	#### ROM behavior
185	311
186		-On cold boot, ROM exposes the `CALIPTRA_FW_LOAD` mailbox command to accept
	312	+On cold boot, ROM exposes the `FIRMWARE_LOAD` mailbox command to accept
187	313	the firmware image that ROM will boot. This image includes Manifest, FMC, and Runtime
188	314	firmware.
189	315
190	316	#### Runtime Firmware behavior
191	317
192		-Caliptra Runtime Firmware also exposes the `CALIPTRA_FW_LOAD` mailbox command for loading
	318	+Caliptra Runtime Firmware also exposes the `FIRMWARE_LOAD` mailbox command for loading
193	319	impactless updates. For more information, see [Runtime Firmware updates](#runtime-firmware-updates).
194	320
195	321	Command Code: `0x4657_4C44` ("FWLD")
196	322
197		-Table: `CALIPTRA_FW_LOAD` input arguments
	323	+Table: `FIRMWARE_LOAD` input arguments
198	324
199	325	\| Name \| Type \| Description
200	326	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
201	327	\| data \| u8[...] \| Firmware image to load.
202	328
203		-`CALIPTRA_FW_LOAD` returns no output arguments.
	329	+`FIRMWARE_LOAD` returns no output arguments.
	330	+
	331	+### FIRMWARE\_VERIFY
	332	+
	333	+The `FIRMWARE_VERIFY` command is used to verify a Caliptra Firmware Bundle.
	334	+
	335	+Command Code: `0x4657_5652` ("FWVR")
	336	+
	337	+Table: `FIRMWARE_VERIFY` input arguments
	338	+
	339	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	340	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	341	+\| data \| u8[...] \| Firmware image bundle to verify.
	342	+
	343	+Table: `FIRMWARE_VERIFY` output arguments
	344	+
	345	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	346	+\| -------------- \| -------------- \| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- \|
	347	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
	348	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error. \|
	349	+\| verify_result \| u32 \| VERIFY_SUCCESS (0xDEADC0DE), VERIFY_FAILED (0x21523F21) \|
	350	+
204	351
205	352	### CAPABILITIES
206	353
@@ -222,13 +369,13 @@
222	369	\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
223	370	\| capabilities \| u8[16] \| Firmware capabilities
224	371
225		-### GET\_IDEV\_CERT
226		-
227		-Exposes a command to reconstruct the IDEVID CERT.
	372	+### GET\_IDEV\_ECC384\_CERT
	373	+
	374	+Exposes a command to reconstruct the ECC384 IDEV CERT.
228	375
229	376	Command Code: `0x4944_4543` ("IDEC")
230	377
231		-Table: `GET_IDEV_CERT` input arguments
	378	+Table: `GET_IDEV_ECC384_CERT` input arguments
232	379
233	380	\| Name \| Type \| Description
234	381	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
@@ -238,51 +385,98 @@
238	385	\| tbs\_size \| u32 \| Size of the TBS.
239	386	\| tbs \| u8[916] \| TBS, with a maximum size of 916. Only bytes up to tbs_size are used.
240	387
241		-Table: `GET_IDEV_CERT` output arguments
	388	+Table: `GET_IDEV_ECC384_CERT` output arguments
242	389
243	390	\| Name \| Type \| Description
244	391	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
245	392	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
246	393	\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
247		-\| cert\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the cert field in use for the IDevId certificate.
248		-\| cert \| u8[1024] \| DER-encoded IDevID CERT.
249		-
250		-### POPULATE\_IDEV\_CERT
	394	+\| cert\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the cert field in use for the IDev ECC384 certificate.
	395	+\| cert \| u8[1024] \| DER-encoded IDev ECC384 CERT.
	396	+
	397	+### GET\_IDEV\_MLDSA87\_CERT
	398	+
	399	+Exposes a command to reconstruct the MLDSA87 IDEV CERT.
	400	+
	401	+Command Code: `0x4944_4D43` ("IDMC")
	402	+
	403	+Table: `GET_IDEV_MLDSA87_CERT` input arguments
	404	+
	405	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	406	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	407	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
	408	+\| tbs\_size \| u32 \| Size of the TBS.
	409	+\| signature \| u8[4628] \| MLDSA87 signature bytes.
	410	+\| tbs \| u8[2820] \| TBS, with a maximum size of 2820. Only bytes up to tbs_size are used.
	411	+
	412	+Table: `GET_IDEV_MLDSA87_CERT` output arguments
	413	+
	414	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	415	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	416	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
	417	+\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
	418	+\| cert\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the cert field in use for the IDev MLDSA87 certificate.
	419	+\| cert \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded IDev MLDSA87 CERT.
	420	+
	421	+### POPULATE\_IDEV\_ECC384\_CERT
251	422
252	423	Exposes a command that allows the SoC to provide a DER-encoded
253		-IDevId certificate on every boot. The IDevId certificate is added
	424	+ECC384 IDev certificate on every boot. The ECC384 IDev certificate is added
254	425	to the start of the certificate chain.
255	426
256	427	Command Code: `0x4944_4550` ("IDEP")
257	428
258		-Table: `POPULATE_IDEV_CERT` input arguments
	429	+Table: `POPULATE_IDEV_ECC384_CERT` input arguments
259	430
260	431	\| Name \| Type \| Description
261	432	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
262	433	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
263		-\| cert\_size \| u32 \| Size of the DER-encoded IDevId certificate.
264		-\| cert \| u8[1024] \| DER-encoded IDevID CERT.
265		-
266		-Table: `POPULATE_IDEV_CERT` output arguments
	434	+\| cert\_size \| u32 \| Size of the DER-encoded ECC384 IDevId certificate.
	435	+\| cert \| u8[1024] \| DER-encoded ECC384 IDev CERT.
	436	+
	437	+Table: `POPULATE_IDEV_ECC384_CERT` output arguments
267	438
268	439	\| Name \| Type \| Description
269	440	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
270	441	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
271	442	\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
272	443
273		-### GET\_IDEV\_INFO
274		-
275		-Exposes a command to get an IDEVID public key.
	444	+### POPULATE\_IDEV\_MLDSA87\_CERT
	445	+
	446	+Exposes a command that allows the SoC to provide a DER-encoded
	447	+MLDSA87 IDev certificate on every boot. The MLDSA87 IDev certificate is added
	448	+to the start of the certificate chain.
	449	+
	450	+Command Code: `0x4944_4D50` ("IDMP")
	451	+
	452	+Table: `POPULATE_IDEV_MLDSA87_CERT` input arguments
	453	+
	454	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	455	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	456	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
	457	+\| cert\_size \| u32 \| Size of the DER-encoded MLDSA87 IDev certificate.
	458	+\| cert \| u8[8192] \| DER-encoded MLDSA87 IDev CERT.
	459	+
	460	+Table: `POPULATE_IDEV_MLDSA87_CERT` output arguments
	461	+
	462	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	463	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	464	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
	465	+\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
	466	+
	467	+### GET\_IDEV\_ECC384\_INFO
	468	+
	469	+Exposes a command to get the IDEVID ECC384 public key.
276	470
277	471	Command Code: `0x4944_4549` ("IDEI")
278	472
279		-Table: `GET_IDEV_INFO` input arguments
	473	+Table: `GET_IDEV_ECC384_INFO` input arguments
280	474
281	475	\| Name \| Type \| Description
282	476	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
283	477	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
284	478
285		-Table: `GET_IDEV_INFO` output arguments
	479	+Table: `GET_IDEV_ECC384_INFO` output arguments
286	480
287	481	\| Name \| Type \| Description
288	482	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
@@ -291,78 +485,160 @@
291	485	\| idev\_pub\_x \| u8[48] \| X portion of ECDSA IDevId key.
292	486	\| idev\_pub\_y \| u8[48] \| Y portion of ECDSA IDevId key.
293	487
294		-### GET\_LDEV\_CERT
295		-
296		-Exposes a command to get an LDevID certificate signed by IDevID.
297		-
298		-Command Code: `0x4C44_4556` ("LDEV")
299		-
300		-Table: `GET_LDEV_CERT` input arguments
	488	+### GET\_IDEV\_MLDSA87\_INFO
	489	+
	490	+Exposes a command to get the IDEVID MLDSA87 public key.
	491	+
	492	+Command Code: `0x4944_4D49` ("IDMI")
	493	+
	494	+Table: `GET_IDEV_MLDSA87_INFO` input arguments
301	495
302	496	\| Name \| Type \| Description
303	497	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
304	498	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
305	499
306		-Table: `GET_LDEV_CERT` output arguments
	500	+Table: `GET_IDEV_MLDSA87_INFO` output arguments
	501	+
	502	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	503	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	504	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
	505	+\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
	506	+\| idev\_pub\_key \| u8[2592] \| MLDSA IDevId public key.
	507	+
	508	+### GET\_LDEV\_ECC384\_CERT
	509	+
	510	+Exposes a command to get an LDevID ECC384 certificate signed by ECC384 IDevID private key.
	511	+
	512	+Command Code: `0x4C44_4556` ("LDEV")
	513	+
	514	+Table: `GET_LDEV_ECC384_CERT` input arguments
	515	+
	516	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	517	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	518	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
	519	+
	520	+Table: `GET_LDEV_ECC384_CERT` output arguments
307	521
308	522	\| Name \| Type \| Description
309	523	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
310	524	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
311	525	\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
312	526	\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field.
313		-\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded LDevID certificate.
314		-
315		-### GET\_FMC\_ALIAS\_CERT
316		-
317		-Exposes a command to get an FMC alias certificate signed by LDevID.
318		-
319		-Command Code: `0x4345_5246` ("CERF")
320		-
321		-Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_CERT` input arguments
	527	+\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded ECC384 LDevID certificate.
	528	+
	529	+### GET\_LDEV\_MLDSA87\_CERT
	530	+
	531	+Exposes a command to get an LDevID MLDSA87 certificate signed by MLDSA87 IDevID private key.
	532	+
	533	+Command Code: `0x4C44_4D43` ("LDMC")
	534	+
	535	+Table: `GET_LDEV_MLDSA87_CERT` input arguments
322	536
323	537	\| Name \| Type \| Description
324	538	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
325	539	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
326	540
327		-Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_CERT` output arguments
	541	+Table: `GET_LDEV_MLDSA87_CERT` output arguments
328	542
329	543	\| Name \| Type \| Description
330	544	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
331	545	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
332	546	\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
333	547	\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field.
334		-\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded FMC alias certificate.
335		-
336		-### GET\_RT\_ALIAS\_CERT
337		-
338		-Exposes a command to get a Runtime alias certificate signed by the FMC alias.
339		-
340		-Command Code: `0x4345_5252` ("CERR")
341		-
342		-Table: `GET_RT_ALIAS_CERT` input arguments
	548	+\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded MLDSA87 LDevID certificate.
	549	+
	550	+### GET\_FMC\_ALIAS\_ECC384\_CERT
	551	+
	552	+Exposes a command to get a FMC alias ECC384 certificate signed by the ECC384 LDevID private key.
	553	+
	554	+Command Code: `0x4345_5246` ("CERF")
	555	+
	556	+Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_ECC384_CERT` input arguments
343	557
344	558	\| Name \| Type \| Description
345	559	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
346	560	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
347	561
348		-Table: `GET_RT_ALIAS_CERT` output arguments
	562	+Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_ECC384_CERT` output arguments
349	563
350	564	\| Name \| Type \| Description
351	565	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
352	566	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
353	567	\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
354	568	\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field.
355		-\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded Runtime alias certificate.
	569	+\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded FMC alias ECC384 certificate.
	570	+
	571	+### GET\_FMC\_ALIAS\_MLDSA87\_CERT
	572	+
	573	+Exposes a command to get a FMC alias MLDSA87 certificate signed by the MLDSA87 LDevID private key.
	574	+
	575	+Command Code: `0x434D_4346` ("CMCF")
	576	+
	577	+Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_MLDSA87_CERT` input arguments
	578	+
	579	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	580	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	581	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
	582	+
	583	+Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_MLDSA87_CERT` output arguments
	584	+
	585	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	586	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	587	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
	588	+\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
	589	+\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field.
	590	+\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded FMC alias MLDSA87 certificate.
	591	+
	592	+### GET\_RT\_ALIAS\_ECC384\_CERT
	593	+
	594	+Exposes a command to get a Runtime alias ECC384 certificate signed by the ECC384 FMC alias private key.
	595	+
	596	+Command Code: `0x4345_5252` ("CERR")
	597	+
	598	+Table: `GET_RT_ALIAS_ECC384_CERT` input arguments
	599	+
	600	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	601	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	602	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
	603	+
	604	+Table: `GET_RT_ALIAS_ECC384_CERT` output arguments
	605	+
	606	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	607	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	608	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
	609	+\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
	610	+\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field.
	611	+\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded Runtime alias ECC384 certificate.
	612	+
	613	+### GET\_RT\_ALIAS\_MLDSA87\_CERT
	614	+
	615	+Exposes a command to get a Runtime alias MLDSA87 certificate signed by the MLDSA87 FMC alias private key.
	616	+
	617	+Command Code: `0x434D_4352` ("CMCR")
	618	+
	619	+Table: `GET_RT_ALIAS_MLDSA87_CERT` input arguments
	620	+
	621	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	622	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	623	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
	624	+
	625	+Table: `GET_RT_ALIAS_MLDSA87_CERT` output arguments
	626	+
	627	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	628	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	629	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
	630	+\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
	631	+\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field.
	632	+\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded Runtime alias MLDSA87 certificate.
356	633
357	634	### ECDSA384\_SIGNATURE\_VERIFY
358	635
359		-Verifies an ECDSA P-384 signature. The hash to be verified is taken from
360		-Caliptra's SHA384 accelerator peripheral.
	636	+Verifies an ECDSA P-384 signature. The hash to be verified is taken from the input (new in 2.0).
361	637
362	638	In the event of an invalid signature, the mailbox command will report CMD_FAILURE
363	639	and the cause will be logged as a non-fatal error.
364	640
365		-Command Code: `0x5349_4756` ("SIGV")
	641	+Command Code: `0x4543_5632` ("ECV2")
366	642
367	643	Table: `ECDSA384_SIGNATURE_VERIFY` input arguments
368	644
@@ -373,6 +649,7 @@
373	649	\| pub\_key\_y \| u8[48] \| Y portion of ECDSA verification key.
374	650	\| signature\_r \| u8[48] \| R portion of signature to verify.
375	651	\| signature\_s \| u8[48] \| S portion of signature to verify.
	652	+\| hash \| u8[48] \| SHA384 digest to verify.
376	653
377	654	Table: `ECDSA384_SIGNATURE_VERIFY` output arguments
378	655
@@ -383,8 +660,7 @@
383	660
384	661	### LMS\_SIGNATURE\_VERIFY
385	662
386		-Verifies an LMS signature. The hash to be verified is taken from
387		-Caliptra's SHA384 accelerator peripheral.
	663	+Verifies an LMS signature. The hash to be verified is taken from the input (new in 2.0).
388	664
389	665	In the event of an invalid signature, the mailbox command will report CMD_FAILURE
390	666	and the cause will be logged as a non-fatal error.
@@ -399,7 +675,7 @@
399	675	\| w \| 4 \| Width (in bits) of the Winternitz coefficient
400	676	\| h \| 15 \| Height of the tree
401	677
402		-Command Code: `0x4C4D_5356` ("LMSV")
	678	+Command Code: `0x4C4D_5632` ("LMV2")
403	679
404	680	Table: `LMS_SIGNATURE_VERIFY` input arguments
405	681
@@ -414,6 +690,7 @@
414	690	\| signature\_ots \| u8[1252] \| LM-OTS signature
415	691	\| signature\_tree\_type \| u8[4] \| LMS signature Algorithm type. Must equal 12.
416	692	\| signature\_tree\_path \| u8[360] \| Path through the tree from the leaf associated with the LM-OTS signature to the root
	693	+\| hash \| u8[48] \| SHA384 digest to verify.
417	694
418	695	Table: `LMS_SIGNATURE_VERIFY` output arguments
419	696
@@ -422,6 +699,58 @@
422	699	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
423	700	\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
424	701
	702	+### MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_VERIFY
	703	+
	704	+Verifies the signature against the message and MLDSA-87 public key.
	705	+
	706	+The public key and signature formats are described in [FIPS 204](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final).
	707	+
	708	+The command will only return a success if the signature is valid.
	709	+
	710	+Command Code: `0x4D4C_5632` ("MLV2")
	711	+
	712	+Table: `MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_VERIFY` input arguments
	713	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	714	+\| --------- \| ------------ \| ------------------ \|
	715	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	716	+\| pub_key \| u8[2592] \| Public key \|
	717	+\| signature \| u8[4627] \| Signature to check \|
	718	+\| padding \| u8[1] \|\|
	719	+\| data len \| u32 \| Length of message \|
	720	+\| data \| u8[data len] \| Message to check \|
	721	+
	722	+
	723	+
	724	+Table: `MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_VERIFY` output arguments
	725	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	726	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| -------------------------- \|
	727	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	728	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	729	+
	730	+
	731	+
	732	+### INSTALL\_OWNER\_PK\_HASH
	733	+
	734	+Exposes a command to save the owner public key hash in persistent data.
	735	+
	736	+Command Code: `0x4F57_4E50` ("OWNP")
	737	+
	738	+Table: `INSTALL_OWNER_PK_HASH` input arguments
	739	+
	740	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	741	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	742	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
	743	+\| digest \| u32[12] \| Owner public key hash.
	744	+
	745	+Table: `INSTALL_OWNER_PK_HASH` output arguments
	746	+
	747	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	748	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	749	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
	750	+\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
	751	+\| dpe\_result \| u32 \| Result code, 0 on success.
	752	+
	753	+
425	754	### STASH\_MEASUREMENT
426	755
427	756	Makes a measurement into the DPE default context. This command is intended for
@@ -430,7 +759,7 @@
430	759	* Call the DPE DeriveContext command with the DefaultContext in the locality of
431	760	the PL0 PAUSER.
432	761	* Extend the measurement into PCR31 (`PCR_ID_STASH_MEASUREMENT`).
433		-* Note: This command can only be called in the locality of the PL0 PAUSER.
	762	+* Note: This command can only be called in the locality of the PL0 PAUSER.
434	763
435	764	Command Code: `0x4D45_4153` ("MEAS")
436	765
@@ -505,14 +834,14 @@
505	834	\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field.
506	835	\| data \| u8[...] \| DPE response structure as defined in the DPE iRoT profile.
507	836
508		-### QUOTE\_PCRS
509		-
510		-Generates a signed quote over all Caliptra hardware PCRs that are using the Caliptra PCR quoting key.
	837	+### QUOTE\_PCRS\_ECC384
	838	+
	839	+Generates a signed quote over all Caliptra hardware PCRs using the Caliptra PCR ECC384 quoting key.
511	840	All PCR values are hashed together with the nonce to produce the quote.
512	841
513	842	Command Code: `0x5043_5251` ("PCRQ")
514	843
515		-Table: `QUOTE_PCRS` input arguments
	844	+Table: `QUOTE_PCRS_ECC384` input arguments
516	845
517	846	\| Name \| Type \| Description
518	847	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
@@ -521,18 +850,46 @@
521	850
522	851	PcrValue is defined as u8[48]
523	852
524		-Table: `QUOTE_PCRS` output arguments
525		-
526		-\| Name \| Type \| Description
527		-\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
528		-\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
529		-\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
530		-\| PCRs \| PcrValue[32] \| Values of all PCRs.
531		-\| nonce \| u8[32] \| Return the nonce used as input for convenience.
532		-\| digest \| u8[48] \| Return the digest over the PCR values and the nonce.
533		-\| reset\_ctrs \| u32[32] \| Reset counters for all PCRs.
534		-\| signature\_r \| u8[48] \| R portion of the signature over the PCR quote.
535		-\| signature\_s \| u8[48] \| S portion of the signature over the PCR quote.
	853	+Table: `QUOTE_PCRS_ECC384` output arguments
	854	+
	855	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	856	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	857	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
	858	+\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
	859	+\| PCRs \| PcrValue[32] \| Values of all PCRs.
	860	+\| nonce \| u8[32] \| Return the nonce used as input for convenience.
	861	+\| reset\_ctrs \| u32[32] \| Reset counters for all PCRs.
	862	+\| digest \| u8[48] \| Return the lower 48 bytes of SHA2-512 digest over the PCR values and the nonce.
	863	+\| signature\_r \| u8[48] \| ECC P-384 R portion of the signature over the `ecc_digest`. </br> The FMC Alias ECC P-384 private key stored in Key Vault slot 7 is utilized for the signing operation.
	864	+\| signature\_s \| u8[48] \| ECC P-384 S portion of the signature over the `ecc_digest`.
	865	+
	866	+### QUOTE\_PCRS\_MLDSA87
	867	+
	868	+Generates a signed quote over all Caliptra hardware PCRs that are using the Caliptra PCR Mldsa87 quoting key.
	869	+All PCR values are hashed together with the nonce to produce the quote.
	870	+
	871	+Command Code: `0x5043_524D` ("PCRM")
	872	+
	873	+Table: `QUOTE_PCRS_MLDSA87` input arguments
	874	+
	875	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	876	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	877	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
	878	+\| nonce \| u8[32] \| Caller-supplied nonce to be included in signed data.
	879	+
	880	+PcrValue is defined as u8[48]
	881	+
	882	+Table: `QUOTE_PCRS_MLDSA87` output arguments
	883	+
	884	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	885	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	886	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
	887	+\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
	888	+\| PCRs \| PcrValue[32] \| Values of all PCRs.
	889	+\| nonce \| u8[32] \| Return the nonce used as input for convenience.
	890	+\| reset\_ctrs \| u32[32] \| Reset counters for all PCRs.
	891	+\| digest \| u8[64] \| Return the SHA2-512 digest over the PCR values and the nonce, in byte reversed order.
	892	+\| signature \| u8[4628] \| MLDSA-87 signature over the `digest` (4627 bytes + 1 Reserved byte). </br> The FMC Alias MLDSA seed stored in Key Vault slot 8 is utilized to generate the private key, which is subsequently used for the signing operation.
536	893
537	894	### EXTEND\_PCR
538	895
@@ -668,9 +1025,9 @@
668	1025	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
669	1026	\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
670	1027	\| pl0_pauser \| u32 \| PAUSER with PL0 privileges (from image header).
671		-\| runtime_svn \| u32 \| Runtime SVN.
672		-\| min_runtime_svn \| u32 \| Min Runtime SVN.
673		-\| fmc_manifest_svn \| u32 \| FMC SVN.
	1028	+\| firmware_svn \| u32 \| Firmware SVN.
	1029	+\| min_firmware_svn \| u32 \| Min Firmware SVN.
	1030	+\| cold_boot_fw_svn \| u32 \| Cold-boot Firmware SVN.
674	1031	\| attestation_disabled \| u32 \| State of attestation disable.
675	1032	\| rom_revision \| u8[20] \| Revision (Git commit ID) of ROM build.
676	1033	\| fmc_revision \| u8[20] \| Revision (Git commit ID) of FMC build.
@@ -679,6 +1036,8 @@
679	1036	\| fmc_sha384_digest \| u32[12] \| Digest of FMC binary.
680	1037	\| runtime_sha384_digest \| u32[12] \| Digest of runtime binary.
681	1038	\| owner_pub_key_hash \| u32[12] \| Hash of the owner public keys provided in the image bundle manifest.
	1039	+\| authman_sha384_digest \| u32[12] \| Hash of the authorization manifest provided by SET_AUTH_MANIFEST.
	1040	+\| most_recent_fw_error \| u32 \| Most recent FW non-fatal error (shows current non-fatal error if non-zero)
682	1041
683	1042	### VERSION
684	1043
@@ -761,10 +1120,10 @@
761	1120
762	1121	### ADD\_SUBJECT\_ALT\_NAME
763	1122
764		-Provides a subject alternative name otherName. Whenever CERTIFY_KEY_EXTENDED is called with the
765		-DMTF_OTHER_NAME flag after ADD_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME is called, the resulting DPE CSR or leaf certificate
766		-will contain a subject alternative name extension containing the provided otherName, which must be a
767		-DMTF device info. All such certificates produced by CERTIFY_KEY_EXTENDED will continue to have the
	1123	+Provides a subject alternative name otherName. Whenever CERTIFY_KEY_EXTENDED is called with the
	1124	+DMTF_OTHER_NAME flag after ADD_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME is called, the resulting DPE CSR or leaf certificate
	1125	+will contain a subject alternative name extension containing the provided otherName, which must be a
	1126	+DMTF device info. All such certificates produced by CERTIFY_KEY_EXTENDED will continue to have the
768	1127	DMTF otherName subject alternative name extension until reset.
769	1128
770	1129	Command Code: `0x414C_544E` ("ALTN")
@@ -792,178 +1151,1374 @@
792	1151
793	1152	Table: `CERTIFY_KEY_EXTENDED` input arguments
794	1153
795		-\| Name \| Type \| Description
796		-\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
797		-\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian.
798		-\| certify\_key\_req \| u8[72] \| Certify Key Request.
799		-\| flags \| u32 \| Flags determining which custom extensions to include in the certificate.
	1154	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1155	+\| ----------------- \| -------- \| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \|
	1156	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian. \|
	1157	+\| certify\_key\_req \| u8[72] \| Certify Key Request. \|
	1158	+\| flags \| u32 \| Flags determining which custom extensions to include in the certificate. \|
	1159	+
800	1160
801	1161	Table: `CERTIFY_KEY_EXTENDED` input flags
802	1162
803		-\| Name \| Offset
804		-\| -------- \| ----------
805		-\| DMTF_OTHER_NAME \| 1 << 31
	1163	+\| Name \| Offset \|
	1164	+\| --------------- \| ---------- \|
	1165	+\| DMTF_OTHER_NAME \| 1 << 31 \|
	1166	+
806	1167
807	1168	Table: `CERTIFY_KEY_EXTENDED` output arguments
	1169	+
	1170	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1171	+\| ------------------ \| -------- \| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- \|
	1172	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
	1173	+\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error. \|
	1174	+\| certify\_key\_resp \| u8[2176] \| Certify Key Response. \|
	1175	+
	1176	+
	1177	+### SET_AUTH_MANIFEST
	1178	+
	1179	+The SoC uses this command and `SET_IMAGE_METADTA` to program an image manifest for Manifest-Based Image Authorization to Caliptra. In response to these commands, the Caliptra Runtime will verify the manifest by authenticating the public keys and in turn using them to authenticate the IMC. On successful verification, the Runtime will store the IMEs into DCCM for future use.
	1180	+
	1181	+Command Code: `0x4154_4D4E` ("ATMN")
	1182	+
	1183	+Table: `SET_AUTH_MANIFEST` input arguments
808	1184
809	1185	\| Name \| Type \| Description
810	1186	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
811		-\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian.
812		-\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error.
813		-\| certify\_key\_resp \| u8[2176] \| Certify Key Response.
814		-
815		-### SET\_AUTH\_MANIFEST
816		-
817		-Command Code: `0x4154_4D4E` ("ATMN")
818		-
819		-Table: `SET_AUTH_MANIFEST` input arguments
820		-
821		-\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
822		-\| ------------------------------ \| ------------------ \| --------------- \|
823	1187	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian. \|
824	1188	\| manifest size \| u32 \| The size of the full Authentication Manifest \|
825		-\| manifest\_marker \| u32 \| Marker needs to be 0x4154_4D4E for the preamble to be valid \|
	1189	+\| preamble\_marker \| u32 \| Marker needs to be 0x4154_4D4E for the preamble to be valid \|
826	1190	\| preamble\_size \| u32 \| Size of the preamble \|
827		-\| manifest\_version \| u32 \| Version of the preamble \|
828		-\| manifest\_flags \| u32 \| Manifest flags. See `AUTH_MANIFEST_FLAGS` below. \|
829		-\| manifest\_vendor\_ecc384\_key \| u32[24] \| Manifest Vendor ECC P-384 public key used to verify the IMC Signature. <br> X-Coordinate: Public Key X-Coordinate (48 bytes) <br> Y-Coordinate: Public Key Y-Coordinate (48 bytes) \|
830		-\| manifest\_vendor\_lms\_key \| u32[12] \| Manifest Vendor LMS public key used to verify the IMC Signature. <br> tree_type: LMS Algorithm Type (4 bytes) <br> otstype: LMS Ots Algorithm Type (4 bytes) <br> id: (16 bytes) <br> digest: (24 bytes) <br> Note: If LMS validation is not required, this should field should be zeroed out. \|
831		-\| manifest\_vendor\_ecc384\_sig \| u32[24] \| Manifest Vendor ECDSA P-384 signature of the Version, Flags, Vendor ECC and LMS public keys, hashed using SHA2-384. <br> R-Coordinate: Random Point (48 bytes) <br> S-Coordinate: Proof (48 bytes) \|
832		-\| manifest\_vendor\_LMS\_sig \| u32[405] \| Vendor LMS signature of the Version, Flags, Vendor ECC and LMS public keys, hashed using SHA2-384. <br> q: Leaf of the Merkle tree where the OTS public key appears (4 bytes) <br> ots: Lmots Signature (1252 bytes) <br> tree_type: Lms Algorithm Type (4 bytes) <br> tree_path: Path through the tree from the leaf associated with the LM-OTS signature to the root. (360 bytes) <br> Note: If LMS validation is not required, this should field should be zeroed out. \|
833		-\| manifest\_owner\_ecc384\_key \| u32[24] \| Manifest Owner ECC P-384 public key used to verify the IMC Signature. <br> X-Coordinate: Public Key X-Coordinate (48 bytes) <br> Y-Coordinate: Public Key Y-Coordinate (48 bytes) \|
834		-\| manifest\_owner\_lms\_key \| u32[12] \| Manifest Owner LMS public key used to verify the IMC Signature. <br> tree_type: LMS Algorithm Type (4 bytes) <br> otstype: LMS Ots Algorithm Type (4 bytes) <br> id: (16 bytes) <br> digest: (24 bytes) <br> Note: If LMS validation is not required, this should field should be zeroed out. \|
835		-\| manifest\_owner\_ecc384\_sig \| u32[24] \| Owner ECDSA P-384 signature of the Owner ECC and LMS public keys, hashed using SHA2-384. <br> R-Coordinate: Random Point (48 bytes) <br> S-Coordinate: Proof (48 bytes) \|
836		-\| manifest\_owner\_LMS\_sig \| u32[405] \| Owner LMS signature of the Version, Flags, Owner ECC and LMS public keys, hashed using SHA2-384. <br> q: Leaf of the Merkle tree where the OTS public key appears (4 bytes) <br> ots: Lmots Signature (1252 bytes) <br> tree_type: Lms Algorithm Type (4 bytes) <br> tree_path: Path through the tree from the leaf associated with the LM-OTS signature to the root. (360 bytes) <br> Note: If LMS validation is not required, this should field should be zeroed out. \|
837		-\| metadata\_vendor\_ecc384\_sig \| u32[24] \| Metadata Vendor ECC384 signature over the image metadata collection using the manifest vendor ecc384 key. \|
838		-\| metadata\_vendor\_LMS\_sig \| u32[405] \| Metadata Vendor LMOTS-SHA192-W4 signature over the image metadata collection using the manifest vendor LMS key. \|
839		-\| metadata\_owner\_ecc384\_sig \| u32[24] \| Metadata Owner ECC384 signature over the image metadata collection using the manifest owner ecc384 key. \|
840		-\| metadata\_owner\_LMS\_sig \| u32[405] \| Metadata Owner LMOTS-SHA192-W4 signature over the image metadata collection manifest owner LMS key. \|
	1191	+\| preamble\_version \| u32 \| Version of the preamble \|
	1192	+\| preamble\_flags \| u32 \| Manifest flags. See AUTH_MANIFEST_FLAGS below \|
	1193	+\| preamble\_vendor\_ecc384\_key \| u32[24] \| Vendor ECC384 key with X and Y coordinates in that order \|
	1194	+\| preamble\_vendor\_pqc\_key \| u32[648] \| Vendor MLDSA-87 or LMS-SHA192-H15 key \|
	1195	+\| preamble\_vendor\_ecc384\_sig \| u32[24] \| Vendor ECC384 signature \|
	1196	+\| preamble\_vendor\_PQC\_sig \| u32[1157] \| Vendor MLDSA-87 or LMOTS-SHA192-W4 signature \|
	1197	+\| preamble\_owner\_ecc384\_key \| u32[24] \| Owner ECC384 key with X and Y coordinates in that order \|
	1198	+\| preamble\_owner\_pqc\_key \| u32[648] \| Owner MLDSA-87 or LMS-SHA192-H15 key \|
	1199	+\| preamble\_owner\_ecc384\_sig \| u32[24] \| Owner ECC384 signature \|
	1200	+\| preamble\_owner\_PQC\_sig \| u32[1157] \| Owner MLDSA-87 or LMOTS-SHA192-W4 signature \|
	1201	+\| metadata\_vendor\_ecc384\_sig \| u32[24] \| Metadata Vendor ECC384 signature \|
	1202	+\| metadata\_vendor\_PQC\_sig \| u32[1157] \| Metadata Vendor MLDSA-87 or LMOTS-SHA192-W4 signature \|
	1203	+\| metadata\_owner\_ecc384\_sig \| u32[24] \| Metadata Owner ECC384 signature \|
	1204	+\| metadata\_owner\_PQC\_sig \| u32[1157] \| Metadata Owner MLDSA-87 or LMOTS-SHA192-W4 signature \|
841	1205	\| metadata\_entry\_entry\_count \| u32 \| number of metadata entries \|
842		-\| metadata\_entries \| MetaData[127] \| The max number of metadata entries is 127 but less can be used \|
	1206	+\| metadata\_entries \| Metadata[127] \| The max number of metadata entries is 127 but less can be used \|
843	1207
844	1208
845	1209
846	1210	Table: `AUTH_MANIFEST_FLAGS` input flags
847		-
848	1211	\| Name \| Value \|
849		-\| --------------------------- \| ----------- \|
	1212	+\| ------------------------- \| --------- \|
850	1213	\| VENDOR_SIGNATURE_REQUIRED \| 1 << 0 \|
851	1214
852	1215
853	1216	Table: `AUTH_MANIFEST_METADATA_ENTRY` digest entries
854	1217
855		-\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
856		-\| --------------- \| ---------- \| ---------------------------------- \|
857		-\| fw\_id \| u32 \| Id of the image \|
858		-\| flags \| u32 \| See `METADATA_ENTRY_FLAGS` below \|
859		-\| digest \| u32[48] \| Digest of the image \|
860		-
861		-
862		-
863		-Table: `METADATA_ENTRY_FLAGS` input flags
864		-
865		-\| Name \| Size (Bits) \| Description \|
866		-\| --------------------- \| ----------------- \| ----------------- \|
867		-\| image\_source \| 2 \| 1: InRequest \|
868		-\| ignore\_auth\_check \| 1 \| If set, the image digest is not compared for the firmware id \|
869		-
870		-
871		-Table: `SET_AUTH_MANIFEST` output arguments
872		-
873		-\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
874		-\| -------- \| -------- \| --------------- \|
875		-\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
876		-\| fips\_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error. \|
877		-
	1218	+
	1219	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1220	+\| ------------------------ \| --------- \| ---------------- \|
	1221	+\| Image Hash \| u8[48] \| SHA2-384 hash of a SOC image. \|
	1222	+
	1223	+\| Image_id \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Image Identifier` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1224	+\| Component_id \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Component Id` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1225	+\| flags \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `flags` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1226	+\| Image Load Address High \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Image Load Address High` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1227	+\| Image Load Address Low \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Image Load Address Low` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1228	+\| Staging Address High \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Staging Address High` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1229	+\| Staging Address Low \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Staging Address Low` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1230	+\| Classification \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Classification` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1231	+\| Version Number \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Version Number` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1232	+\| Version String \| u8[32] \| This corresponds to the `Version String` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1233	+
	1234	+### VERIFY_AUTH_MANIFEST
	1235	+
	1236	+This command verifies the integrity and authenticity of the provided image manifest. Unlike `SET_AUTH_MANIFEST`, it performs validation only and does not persist the manifest in DCCM.
	1237	+
	1238	+Command Code: `0x4154_564D` ("ATVM")
	1239	+
	1240	+The input arguments are the same as the `SET_AUTH_MANIFEST` command.
878	1241
879	1242
880	1243	### AUTHORIZE_AND_STASH
881	1244
	1245	+The SoC uses this command to request authorization of its various SoC images. This command has the option to receive the image hash directly from SoC or from an external source (e.g., SHA Acc).
	1246	+
	1247	+The SoC uses this command repeatedly to ask for authorization to run its different images. The Runtime will verify that the image hash is contained in the IMC and will allow or reject the image based on that check. The command also enables stashing of the image hash by default with an option to skip stashing if needed. The SVN field is intended for anti-rollback protection.
	1248	+
	1249	+
882	1250	Command Code: `0x4154_5348` ("ATSH")
883	1251
884	1252	Table: `AUTHORIZE_AND_STASH` input arguments
885	1253
886		-\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
887		-\| ------------ \| -------- \| --------------- \|
	1254	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	1255	+\| ------------\| -------- \| ---------------
888	1256	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian. \|
889	1257	\| fw_id \| u8[4] \| Firmware id of the image, in little-endian format \|
890		-\| measurement \| u8[48] \| Digest of the image requested for authorization \|
	1258	+\| measurement \| u8[48] \| Digest of the image requested for authorization. The `source` field needs to be set to '1` for InRequest, otherwise<br />this field is ignored. \|
891	1259	\| context \| u8[48] \| Context field for `svn`; e.g., a hash of the public key that authenticated the SVN. \|
892		-\| svn \| u32 \| SVN \|
	1260	+\| svn \| u32 \| The version of the image \|
893	1261	\| flags \| u32 \| See AUTHORIZE_AND_STASH_FLAGS below \|
894		-\| source \| u32 \| Enumeration values: { InRequest(1) } \|
	1262	+\| source \| u32 \| This field identifies the source of the digest to be used to compare with the SoC's<br />SHA digest in the SoC Manifest<br /><br />Values<br />1 - InRequest - Use the hash in the 'measurement' field of this command<br /><br />3 - LoadAddress - The image located in the `ImageLoadAddress` will be streamed to the SHA Accelerator to <br /> retrieve the digest that will be used for authorization.<br />4 - ImageStagingAddress - The image located in the `StagingAddress` will be streamed to the SHA Accelerator to<br /> retrieve the digest that will be used for authorization \|
	1263	+\| image_size \| u32 \| The size of the image to hash. Only valid if source is `ImageLoadAddress` or `StagingAddress` \|
895	1264
896	1265
897	1266	Table: `AUTHORIZE_AND_STASH_FLAGS` input flags
898		-
899	1267	\| Name \| Value \|
900		-\| ------------ \| ------------ \|
	1268	+\| ----------- \| --------- \|
901	1269	\| SKIP\_STASH \| 1 << 0 \|
902	1270
903	1271
904	1272	Table: `AUTHORIZE_AND_STASH` output arguments
905		-\| Name \| Type \| Description
906		-\| ----------------\| -------- \| ---------------
	1273	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1274	+\| --------------- \| -------- \| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- \|
907	1275	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
908	1276	\| fips_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error. \|
909		-\| auth_req_result \| u32 \| AUTHORIZE_IMAGE (0xDEADC0DE), IMAGE_NOT_AUTHORIZED (0x21523F21) or IMAGE_HASH_MISMATCH (0x8BFB95CB) \|
910		-
911		-
912		-### GET\_IDEVID\_CSR
913		-
914		-Command Code: `0x4944_4352` ("IDCR")
915		-
916		-Table: `GET_IDEVID_CSR` input arguments
	1277	+
	1278	+\| auth_req_result \| u32 \|AUTHORIZE_IMAGE (0xDEADC0DE), IMAGE_NOT_AUTHORIZED (0x21523F21) or IMAGE_HASH_MISMATCH (0x8BFB95CB)
	1279	+
	1280	+### GET_IMAGE_INFO
	1281	+
	1282	+The MCU uses this command to retrieve the Image Metadata Entry defined in the SoC Manifest given by an index to the Image Metadata Collection (IMC).
	1283	+
	1284	+Command Code: `0x494D_4530` ("IME0")
	1285	+
	1286	+Table: `GET_IMAGE_INFO` input arguments
	1287	+
	1288	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1289	+\| -------------- \| -------------- \| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \|
	1290	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian. \|
	1291	+
	1292	+\| fw_id \| u32 \| Firmware id of the image, in little-endian format
	1293	+
	1294	+Table: `GET_IMAGE_INFO` output arguments
	1295	+
	1296	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1297	+\| -------------- \| -------------- \| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \|
	1298	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
	1299	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error. \|
	1300	+
	1301	+\| Component_id \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Component Id` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1302	+\| flags \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `flags` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1303	+\| Image Load Address High \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Image Load Address High` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1304	+\| Image Load Address Low \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Image Load Address Low` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1305	+\| Staging Address High \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Staging Address High` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1306	+\| Staging Address Low \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Staging Address Low` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1307	+\| Classification \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Classification` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1308	+\| Version Number \| u32 \| This corresponds to the `Version Number` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1309	+\| Version String \| u8[32] \| This corresponds to the `Version String` field in the [SoC Manifest](https://github.com/chipsalliance/caliptra-sw/blob/main-2.x/auth-manifest/README.md)
	1310	+
	1311	+
	1312	+
	1313	+### ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE
	1314	+
	1315	+The MCU uses this command to 'activate' the image that has been previously downloaded through PLDM - T5.
	1316	+For the full behavior of this command, refer to the [Subsystem Support for Hitless Updates](https://github.com/chipsalliance/Caliptra/blob/main/doc/Caliptra.md#subsystem-support-for-hitless-updates) specification.
	1317	+
	1318	+Command Code: `0x4143_5446` ("ACTF")
	1319	+
	1320	+Table: `ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE` input arguments
	1321	+
	1322	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1323	+\| -------------- \| -------------- \| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \|
	1324	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian. \|
	1325	+\| count \| u32 \| Number of image_ids to activate. Item count of image_ids array parameter \|
	1326	+\| mcu_image_size \| u32 \| Size of MCU image, if included in the activation \|
	1327	+\| image_ids \| Array of u8[4] \| Array of Image ids in little-endian format \|
	1328	+
	1329	+
	1330	+Table: `ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE` output arguments
	1331	+
	1332	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1333	+\| -------------- \| -------------- \| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- \|
	1334	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
	1335	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| Indicates if the command is FIPS approved or an error. \|
	1336	+
	1337	+
	1338	+## Mailbox commands: Cryptographic Mailbox (2.0)
	1339	+
	1340	+These commands are used by the [Cryptograhic Mailbox](#cryptographic-mailbox-commands-new-in-20) system.
	1341	+
	1342	+### CM_SHA_INIT
	1343	+
	1344	+This starts the computation of a SHA hash of data, which may be larger than a single mailbox command allows. It also supports additional algorithms.
	1345	+
	1346	+Note: ROM provides a simpler one-shot `CM_SHA` command for hashing data in a single operation. However, that command is ROM-only and is not available in runtime. For runtime, use these streaming commands (CM_SHA_INIT, CM_SHA_UPDATE, CM_SHA_FINAL) which support contexts and incremental hashing of large data.
	1347	+
	1348	+The sequence to use these are:
	1349	+* 1 `CM_SHA_INIT` command
	1350	+* 0 or more `CM_SHA_UPDATE` commands
	1351	+* 1 `CM_SHA_FINAL` command
	1352	+
	1353	+For each command, the context from the previous command's output must be passed as an input.
	1354	+
	1355	+The `SHA_CONTEXT_SIZE` is always exactly 200 bytes long.
	1356	+
	1357	+The maximum supported data size for the SHA commands is 4096 bytes.
	1358	+
	1359	+Command Code: `0x434D_5349` ("CMSI")
	1360	+
	1361	+Table: `CM_SHA_INIT` input arguments
	1362	+
	1363	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1364	+\| -------------- \| ------------- \| ------------------ \|
	1365	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1366	+\| hash algorithm \| u32 \| Enum. \|
	1367	+\|\|\| Value 0 = reserved \|
	1368	+\|\|\| Value 1 = SHA2-384 \|
	1369	+\|\|\| Value 2 = SHA2-512 \|
	1370	+\| data size \| u32 \|\|
	1371	+\| data \| u8[data size] \| Data to hash \|
	1372	+
	1373	+
	1374	+Table: `CM_SHA_INIT` output arguments
	1375	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1376	+\| ------------ \| -------------------- \| ------------------------------------------ \|
	1377	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1378	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1379	+\| context \| u8[SHA_CONTEXT_SIZE] \| Passed to `CM_SHA_UPDATE` / `CM_SHA_FINAL` \|
	1380	+
	1381	+
	1382	+Table: `CM_SHA_INIT` / `CM_SHA_UPDATE` / `CM_SHA_FINAL` internal context
	1383	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1384	+\| ----------------- \| -------- \| --------------- \|
	1385	+\| input buffer \| u8[128] \|\|
	1386	+\| intermediate hash \| u8[64] \|\|
	1387	+\| length \| u32 \|\|
	1388	+\| hash algorithm \| u32 \|\|
	1389	+
	1390	+
	1391	+### CM_SHA_UPDATE
	1392	+
	1393	+This continues a SHA computation started by `CM_SHA_INIT` or from another `CM_SHA_UPDATE`.
	1394	+
	1395	+The context MUST be passed in from `CM_SHA_INIT` or `CM_SHA_UPDATE`.
	1396	+
	1397	+Command Code: `0x434D_5355` ("CMSU")
	1398	+
	1399	+Table: `CM_SHA_UPDATE` input arguments
	1400	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1401	+\| ------------ \| -------------------- \| ------------------------------------ \|
	1402	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1403	+\| context \| u8[SHA_CONTEXT_SIZE] \| From `CM_SHA_INIT` / `CM_SHA_UPDATE` \|
	1404	+\| data size \| u32 \|\|
	1405	+\| data \| u8[data size] \| Data to hash \|
	1406	+
	1407	+
	1408	+Table: `CM_SHA_UPDATE` output arguments
	1409	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1410	+\| ------------ \| -------------------- \| ------------------------------------------ \|
	1411	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1412	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1413	+\| context \| u8[SHA_CONTEXT_SIZE] \| Passed to `CM_SHA_UPDATE` / `CM_SHA_FINAL` \|
	1414	+
	1415	+
	1416	+### CM_SHA_FINAL
	1417	+
	1418	+This finalizes the computation of a SHA and produces the hash of all of the data.
	1419	+
	1420	+The context MUST be passed in from `CM_SHA_INIT` or `CMA_SHA_UPDATE`.
	1421	+
	1422	+Command Code: `0x434D_5346` ("CMSF")
	1423	+
	1424	+Table: `CM_SHA_FINAL` input arguments
	1425	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1426	+\| ------------ \| -------------------- \| ------------------------------------ \|
	1427	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1428	+\| context \| u8[SHA_CONTEXT_SIZE] \| From `CM_SHA_INIT` / `CM_SHA_UPDATE` \|
	1429	+\| data size \| u32 \| May be 0 \|
	1430	+\| data \| u8[data size] \| Data to hash \|
	1431	+
	1432	+
	1433	+Table: `CM_SHA_FINAL` output arguments
	1434	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1435	+\| ----------- \| ------------- \| ------------------------- \|
	1436	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1437	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1438	+\| hash size \| u32 \|\|
	1439	+\| hash \| u8[hash size] \|\|
	1440	+
	1441	+
	1442	+### CM\_HMAC
	1443	+
	1444	+Computes an HMAC according to [RFC 2104](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2104) with select SHA algorithm support. The data must fit into a single mailbox command.
	1445	+
	1446	+The CMK must have been created for HMAC / HKDF usage.
	1447	+
	1448	+Command Code: `0x434D_484D` ("CMHM")
	1449	+
	1450	+Table: `CM_HMAC` input arguments
	1451	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1452	+\| -------------- \| ------------- \| ----------------- \|
	1453	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1454	+\| CMK \| CMK \| CMK to use as key \|
	1455	+\| hash algorithm \| u32 \| Enum. \|
	1456	+\|\|\| 0 = reserved \|
	1457	+\|\|\| 1 = SHA2-384 \|
	1458	+\|\|\| 2 = SHA2-512 \|
	1459	+\| data size \| u32 \|\|
	1460	+\| data \| u8[data size] \| Data to MAC \|
	1461	+
	1462	+
	1463	+
	1464	+Table: `CM_HMAC` output arguments
	1465	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1466	+\| ----------- \| ------------ \| ------------------------- \|
	1467	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1468	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1469	+\| mac size \| u32 \|\|
	1470	+\| mac \| u8[mac size] \|\|
	1471	+
	1472	+
	1473	+### CM_HMAC_KDF_COUNTER
	1474	+
	1475	+Implements HMAC KDF in Counter Moder as specified in as specified in [RFC 5869](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869.html) and [NIST SP800-108](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/108/r1/upd1/final) Section 4.1 (KDF in Counter Mode, Section 4.1).
	1476	+
	1477	+The CMK must have been created for HMAC usage.
	1478	+
	1479	+The output length will be automatically chosen to match the key usage.
	1480	+
	1481	+Command Code: `0x434D_4B43` ("CMKC")
	1482	+
	1483	+Table: `CM_HMAC_KDF_COUNTER` input arguments
	1484	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1485	+\| -------------- \| -------------- \| ------------------------- \|
	1486	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1487	+\| KIN CMK \| CMK \| Input key \|
	1488	+\| hash algorithm \| u32 \| Enum. \|
	1489	+\|\|\| Value 0 = reserved \|
	1490	+\|\|\| Value 1 = SHA2-384 \|
	1491	+\|\|\| Value 2 = SHA2-512 \|
	1492	+\| key usage \| u32 \| usage tag of output key \|
	1493	+\| key size \| u32 \| size (in bytes) for the output key; MUST be valid for the key usage \|
	1494	+\| label size \| u32 \|\|
	1495	+\| label \| u8[label size] \|\|
	1496	+
	1497	+
	1498	+Table: `CM_HMAC_KDF_COUNTER` output arguments
	1499	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1500	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| --------------------------------------- \|
	1501	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1502	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1503	+\| KOUT CMK \| CMK \| CMK that stores the output key material \|
	1504	+
	1505	+
	1506	+### CM_HKDF_EXTRACT
	1507	+
	1508	+Implements HKDF-Extract as specified in [RFC 5869](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869.html).
	1509	+
	1510	+The CMKs for IKM and salt must have been created for HMAC usage. The output will be tagged for HMAC usage.
	1511	+
	1512	+Use CM_IMPORT to import non-secret (plaintext) salt or IKMs to use
	1513	+with HKDF-Extract after right-padding to 48 or 64 bytes with zeros.
	1514	+
	1515	+Command Code: `0x434D_4B54` ("CMKT")
	1516	+
	1517	+Table: `CM_HKDF_EXTRACT` input arguments
	1518	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1519	+\| -------------- \| -------- \| ------------------------- \|
	1520	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1521	+\| hash algorithm \| u32 \| Enum. \|
	1522	+\|\|\| Value 0 = reserved \|
	1523	+\|\|\| Value 1 = SHA2-384 \|
	1524	+\|\|\| Value 2 = SHA2-512 \|
	1525	+\| salt CMK \| CMK \| Salt CMK. \|
	1526	+\| IKM CMK \| CMK \| Input key material CMK \|
	1527	+
	1528	+
	1529	+Table: `CM_HKDF_EXTRACT` output arguments
	1530	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1531	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| --------------------------------------- \|
	1532	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1533	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1534	+\| PRK CMK \| u8[32] \| CMK that stores the output (PRK) to use \|
	1535	+\|\|\| with HKDF-Expand \|
	1536	+
	1537	+
	1538	+### CM_HKDF_EXPAND
	1539	+
	1540	+Implements HKDF-Expand as specified in [RFC 5869](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869.html).
	1541	+
	1542	+The CMK must have been created for HMAC usage.
	1543	+
	1544	+The output length will be automatically chosen to match the key usage.
	1545	+
	1546	+Command Code: `0x434D_4B50` ("CMKP")
	1547	+
	1548	+Table: `CM_HKDF_EXPAND` input arguments
	1549	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1550	+\| -------------- \| ------------- \| ------------------------------- \|
	1551	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1552	+\| PRK CMK \| CMK \|\|
	1553	+\| hash algorithm \| u32 \| Enum. \|
	1554	+\|\|\| Value 0 = reserved \|
	1555	+\|\|\| Value 1 = SHA2-384 \|
	1556	+\|\|\| Value 2 = SHA2-512 \|
	1557	+\| key usage \| u32 \| usage tag of output key \|
	1558	+\| key size \| u32 \| size (in bytes) for the OKM; \|
	1559	+\|\|\| MUST be valid for the key usage \|
	1560	+\| info size \| u32 \|\|
	1561	+\| info \| u8[info size] \|\|
	1562	+
	1563	+
	1564	+Table: `CM_HKDF_EXPAND` output arguments
	1565	+Command Code: `0x434D_4B43` ("CMKC")
	1566	+
	1567	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1568	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| --------------------------------------- \|
	1569	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1570	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1571	+\| OKM CMK \| CMK \| CMK that stores the output key material \|
	1572	+
	1573	+
	1574	+
	1575	+### CM_MLDSA_PUBLIC_KEY
	1576	+
	1577	+Returns the public key associated with the MLDSA-87 key (seed) in a CMK.
	1578	+
	1579	+The public key format is described in [FIPS 204](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final).
	1580	+
	1581	+Command Code: `0x434D_4D50` ("CMMP")
	1582	+
	1583	+Table: `CM_MLDSA_PUBLIC_KEY` input arguments
	1584	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1585	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ----------------- \|
	1586	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1587	+\| CMK \| CMK \| Private key seed \|
	1588	+
	1589	+
	1590	+Table: `CM_MLDSA_PUBLIC_KEY` output arguments
	1591	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1592	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| -------------------------- \|
	1593	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1594	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1595	+\| Public key \| u8[2592] \| Public key \|
	1596	+
	1597	+
	1598	+### CM_MLDSA_SIGN
	1599	+
	1600	+Signs the message with the MLDSA-87 key.
	1601	+
	1602	+The signature format is described in [FIPS 204](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final).
	1603	+
	1604	+Command Code: `0x434D_4D53` ("CMMS")
	1605	+
	1606	+Table: `CM_MLDSA_SIGN` input arguments
	1607	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1608	+\| -------- \| ------------ \| ----------------- \|
	1609	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1610	+\| CMK \| CMK \| Private key seed \|
	1611	+\| data len \| u32 \| Length of message \|
	1612	+\| data \| u8[data len] \| Message to sign \|
	1613	+
	1614	+
	1615	+Table: `CM_MLDSA_SIGN` output arguments
	1616	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1617	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| -------------------------- \|
	1618	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1619	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1620	+\| signature \| u8[4627] \| Signature \|
	1621	+\| padding \| u8[1] \|\|
	1622	+
	1623	+
	1624	+### CM_MLDSA_VERIFY
	1625	+
	1626	+Verifies the signature against the message and MLDSA-87 key.
	1627	+
	1628	+The signature format is described in [FIPS 204](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final).
	1629	+
	1630	+The command will only return a success if the signature is valid.
	1631	+
	1632	+Command Code: `0x434D_4D56` ("CMMV")
	1633	+
	1634	+Table: `CM_MLDSA_VERIFY` input arguments
	1635	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1636	+\| --------- \| ------------ \| ------------------ \|
	1637	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1638	+\| CMK \| CMK \| Private key seed \|
	1639	+\| signature \| u8[4627] \| Signature to check \|
	1640	+\| padding \| u8[1] \|\|
	1641	+\| data len \| u32 \| Length of message \|
	1642	+\| data \| u8[data len] \| Message to check \|
	1643	+
	1644	+
	1645	+Table: `CM_MLDSA_VERIFY` output arguments
	1646	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1647	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| -------------------------- \|
	1648	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1649	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1650	+
	1651	+
	1652	+### CM_ECDSA_PUBLIC_KEY
	1653	+
	1654	+Returns the public key associated with the ECDSA-384 key seed in a CMK.
	1655	+
	1656	+The public key consists of its `x` and `y` values described in [FIPS 186-5](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-5/final) encoded in big-endian byte order.
	1657	+
	1658	+Command Code: `0x434D_4550` ("CMEP")
	1659	+
	1660	+Table: `CM_ECDSA_PUBLIC_KEY` input arguments
	1661	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1662	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ----------------- \|
	1663	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1664	+\| CMK \| CMK \| Private key seed \|
	1665	+
	1666	+
	1667	+Table: `CM_ECDSA_PUBLIC_KEY` output arguments
	1668	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1669	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| -------------------------- \|
	1670	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1671	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1672	+\| pubkey_x \| u8[48] \| The X BigNum of the ECDSA public key generated from the seed \|
	1673	+\| pubkey_y \| u8[48] \| The Y BigNum of the ECDSA public key generated from the seed \|
	1674	+
	1675	+
	1676	+### CM_ECDSA_SIGN
	1677	+
	1678	+Signs the SHA384 hash of the message with the ECDSA-384 key.
	1679	+
	1680	+The signature consists of its `r` and `s` values described in [FIPS 186-5](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-5/final) encoded in big-endian byte order.
	1681	+
	1682	+Command Code: `0x434D_5D53` ("CMES")
	1683	+
	1684	+Table: `CM_ECDSA_SIGN` input arguments
	1685	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1686	+\| -------- \| ------------ \| ----------------- \|
	1687	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1688	+\| CMK \| CMK \| Private key seed \|
	1689	+\| data len \| u32 \| Length of message \|
	1690	+\| data \| u8[data len] \| Message to sign \|
	1691	+
	1692	+
	1693	+Table: `CM_ECDSA_SIGN` output arguments
	1694	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1695	+\| ------------ \| -------- \| ------------------------------------ \|
	1696	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1697	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1698	+\| signature_r \| u8[48] \| The R BigNum of the ECDSA signature \|
	1699	+\| signature_s \| u8[48] \| The S BigNum of the ECDSA signature \|
	1700	+
	1701	+
	1702	+### CM_ECDSA_VERIFY
	1703	+
	1704	+Verifies the signature against the SHA384 hash of the message and ECDSA-384 key.
	1705	+
	1706	+The signature consists of its `r` and `s` values described in [FIPS 186-5](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-5/final) encoded in big-endian byte order.
	1707	+
	1708	+The command will only return a success if the signature is valid.
	1709	+
	1710	+Command Code: `0x434D_4556` ("CMEV")
	1711	+
	1712	+Table: `CM_ECDSA_VERIFY` input arguments
	1713	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1714	+\| ------------ \| ------------ \| ----------------------------------- \|
	1715	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1716	+\| CMK \| CMK \| Private key seed \|
	1717	+\| signature_r \| u8[48] \| The R BigNum of an ECDSA signature \|
	1718	+\| signature_s \| u8[48] \| The S BigNum of an ECDSA signature \|
	1719	+\| data len \| u32 \| Length of message \|
	1720	+\| data \| u8[data len] \| Message to check \|
	1721	+
	1722	+
	1723	+Table: `CM_ECDSA_VERIFY` output arguments
	1724	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1725	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| -------------------------- \|
	1726	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1727	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1728	+
	1729	+
	1730	+### CM_AES_ENCRYPT_INIT
	1731	+
	1732	+Generic AES operation for unauthenticated AES operations.
	1733	+AES GCM operations use separate commands elsewhere.
	1734	+
	1735	+AES-256-CBC only supports using a random 128-bit IV.
	1736	+
	1737	+For CBC, the size must be a multiple of 16 bytes.
	1738	+CTR mode supports input of any size up to the maximum cryptographic mailbox size.
	1739	+
	1740	+The CMK must have been created for AES usage.
	1741	+
	1742	+Command Code: `0x434D_4349` ("CMCI")
	1743	+
	1744	+Table: `CM_AES_ENCRYPT_INIT` input arguments
	1745	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1746	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| ------------------------------------- \|
	1747	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1748	+\| CMK \| CMK \| CMK of the key to use to encrypt \|
	1749	+\| mode/flags \| u32 \| Requested mode and flags. \|
	1750	+\|\|\| 0 = Reserved \|
	1751	+\|\|\| 1 = CBC \|
	1752	+\|\|\| 2 = CTR \|
	1753	+\| plaintext size \| u32 \| MUST be non-zero \|
	1754	+\| plaintext \| u8[plaintext size] \| Data to encrypt \|
	1755	+
	1756	+
	1757	+Table: `CM_AES_ENCRYPT_INIT` output arguments
	1758	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1759	+\| --------------- \| ------------------- \| -------------------------------- \|
	1760	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1761	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1762	+\| context \| AES_CONTEXT \|\|
	1763	+\| iv \| u8[16] \|\|
	1764	+\| ciphertext size \| u32 \|\|
	1765	+\| ciphertext \| u8[ciphertext size] \| Output encrypted data \|
	1766	+
	1767	+
	1768	+The encrypted and authenticated context's internal structure will be:
	1769	+
	1770	+Table: internal context for CM_AES_ operations*
	1771	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1772	+\| -------------- \| -------- \| ------------------------------ \|
	1773	+\| mode \| u32 \|\|
	1774	+\| key \| u8[32] \|\|
	1775	+\| iv \| u8[16] \|\|
	1776	+\| fips_status \| u8 \| 1 = FIPS valid \|
	1777	+\| reserved \| u8[75] \| Reserved for additional fields \|
	1778	+
	1779	+
	1780	+The size of the (encrypted) context is always exactly 156 bytes,
	1781	+and we will use the type `AES_CONTEXT` to represent `u8[156]`.
	1782	+
	1783	+### CM_AES_ENCRYPT_UPDATE
	1784	+
	1785	+This continues (or finishes) an AES computation started by `CM_AES_ENCRYPT_INIT` or from another `CM_AES_ENCRYPT_UPDATE`.
	1786	+
	1787	+There is no `CM_AES_ENCRYPT_FINISH` since unauthenticated AES modes do not output a final tag.
	1788	+
	1789	+The context MUST be passed in from `CM_AES_ENCRYPT_INIT` or `CM_AES_ENCRYPT_UPDATE`.
	1790	+
	1791	+For CBC, the size must be a multiple of 16 bytes.
	1792	+CTR mode supports input of any size up to the maximum cryptographic mailbox size.
	1793	+
	1794	+Command Code: `0x434D_4355` ("CMCU")
	1795	+
	1796	+Table: `CM_AES_ENCRYPT_UPDATE` input arguments
	1797	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1798	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| ---------------- \|
	1799	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1800	+\| context \| AES_CONTEXT \|\|
	1801	+\| plaintext size \| u32 \| MUST be non-zero \|
	1802	+\| plaintext \| u8[plaintext size] \| Data to encrypt \|
	1803	+
	1804	+
	1805	+Table: `CM_AES_ENCRYPT_UPDATE` output arguments
	1806	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1807	+\| -------------- \| ------------------- \| ------------------------- \|
	1808	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1809	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1810	+\| context \| AES_CONTEXT \|\|
	1811	+\| cipertext size \| u32 \|\|
	1812	+\| ciphertext \| u8[ciphertext size] \|\|
	1813	+
	1814	+
	1815	+### CM_AES_DECRYPT_INIT
	1816	+
	1817	+Starts an AES-256 unauthenaticed decryption computation.
	1818	+
	1819	+The CMK must have been created for AES usage.
	1820	+
	1821	+For CBC, the size must be a multiple of 16 bytes.
	1822	+CTR mode supports input of any size up to the maximum cryptographic mailbox size.
	1823	+
	1824	+The IV must match what was passed and returned from the initial encryption operation.
	1825	+
	1826	+Command Code: `0x434D_414A` ("CMAJ")
	1827	+
	1828	+Table: `CM_AES_DECRYPT_INIT` input arguments
	1829	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1830	+\| --------------- \| ------------------- \| ------------------------- \|
	1831	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1832	+\| CMK \| CMK \| CMK to use for decryption \|
	1833	+\| mode/flags \| u32 \| Requested mode and flags. \|
	1834	+\|\|\| 0 = Reserved \|
	1835	+\|\|\| 1 = CBC \|
	1836	+\|\|\| 2 = CTR \|
	1837	+\| iv \| u8[16] \|\|
	1838	+\| ciphertext size \| u32 \| MUST be non-zero \|
	1839	+\| ciphertext \| u8[ciphertext size] \| Data to decrypt \|
	1840	+
	1841	+
	1842	+Table: `CM_AES_DECRYPT_INIT` output arguments
	1843	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1844	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| ------------------------- \|
	1845	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1846	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1847	+\| context \| AES_CONTEXT \|\|
	1848	+\| plaintext size \| u32 \|\|
	1849	+\| plaintext \| u8[plaintext size] \| Decrypted data \|
	1850	+
	1851	+
	1852	+The encrypted and authenticated context's internal structure will be the same as for encryption.
	1853	+
	1854	+### CM_AES_DECRYPT_UPDATE
	1855	+
	1856	+This continues an AES computation started by `CM_AES_DECRYPT_INIT` or from another `CM_AES_DECRYPT_UPDATE`.
	1857	+
	1858	+There is no `CM_AES_DECRYPT_FINISH` since unauthenticated modes do not output a final tag.
	1859	+
	1860	+The context MUST be passed in from `CM_AES_DECRYPT_INIT` or `CM_AES_DECRYPT_UPDATE`.
	1861	+
	1862	+For CBC, the size must be a multiple of 16 bytes.
	1863	+CTR mode supports input of any size up to the maximum cryptographic mailbox size.
	1864	+
	1865	+Command Code: `0x434D_4155` ("CMAU")
	1866	+
	1867	+Table: `CM_AES_DECRYPT_UPDATE` input arguments
	1868	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1869	+\| --------------- \| ------------------- \| ---------------- \|
	1870	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1871	+\| context \| AES_CONTEXT \|\|
	1872	+\| ciphertext size \| u32 \| MUST be non-zero \|
	1873	+\| ciphertext \| u8[ciphertext size] \| Data to decrypt \|
	1874	+
	1875	+
	1876	+Table: `CM_AES_DECRYPT_UPDATE` output arguments
	1877	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1878	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| ------------------------- \|
	1879	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1880	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1881	+\| context \| AES_CONTEXT \|\|
	1882	+\| plaintext size \| u32 \|\|
	1883	+\| plaintext \| u8[plaintext size] \| Decrypted data \|
	1884	+
	1885	+
	1886	+### CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_INIT
	1887	+
	1888	+Currently only supports AES-256-GCM with a random 96-bit IV.
	1889	+
	1890	+Additional authenticated data (AAD) can only be passed during the `INIT` command, so is limited to the maximum cryptographic mailbox data size (4096 bytes).
	1891	+
	1892	+The CMK must have been created for AES usage, except if the SPDM mode flag has been used, in which case the CMK must have been created for HMAC usage.
	1893	+
	1894	+Command Code: `0x434D_4749` ("CMGI")
	1895	+
	1896	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_INIT` input arguments
	1897	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1898	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| -------------------------------- \|
	1899	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1900	+\| reserved \| u32 \|\|
	1901	+\| CMK \| CMK \| CMK of the key to use to encrypt \|
	1902	+\| aad size \| u32 \|\|
	1903	+\| aad \| u8[aad size] \| Additional authenticated data \|
	1904	+
	1905	+
	1906	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_INIT` output arguments
	1907	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1908	+\| -------------- \| ------------------- \| -------------------------------- \|
	1909	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1910	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1911	+\| context \| AES_GCM_CONTEXT \|\|
	1912	+\| iv \| u8[12] \|\|
	1913	+
	1914	+
	1915	+The encrypted and authenticated context's internal structure will be:
	1916	+
	1917	+Table: internal context for CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_ operations*
	1918	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1919	+\| -------------- \| -------- \| --------------------------- \|
	1920	+\| key \| u8[32] \|\|
	1921	+\| iv \| u8[12] \|\|
	1922	+\| aad length \| u32 \|\|
	1923	+\| GHASH state \| u8[16] \|\|
	1924	+\| current length \| u32 \| value mod 16 is buffer size \|
	1925	+\| buffer \| u8[16] \|\|
	1926	+\| fips_status \| u8 \| 1 = FIPS valid \|
	1927	+\| reserved \| u8[15] \|\|
	1928	+
	1929	+
	1930	+The size of the (encrypted) context is always exactly 128 bytes,
	1931	+and we will use the type `AES_GCM_CONTEXT` to represent `u8[128]` below.
	1932	+
	1933	+
	1934	+### CM_AES_GCM_SPDM_ENCRYPT_INIT
	1935	+
	1936	+Derives the AES key and IV following the [SPDM 1.4](https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/dsp0274) and [Secured Messages using SPDM 1.1](https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/dsp0277) specifications.
	1937	+
	1938	+Currently only supports AES-256-GCM.
	1939	+
	1940	+Additional authenticated data (AAD) can only be passed during the `INIT` command, so is limited to the maximum cryptographic mailbox data size (4096 bytes).
	1941	+
	1942	+The CMK must have been created for HMAC usage.
	1943	+
	1944	+The CMK passed in should be the SPDM major secret CMK created for HMAC usage. The key and IV used for encryption shall follow the [SPDM 1.4](https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/dsp0274) section 12.7 derivation with `key_length` equal to 32 bytes and `iv_length` equal to 12 bytes.
	1945	+
	1946	+```
	1947	+EncryptionKey = HKDF-Expand(major-secret, bin_str5, key_length);
	1948	+IV = HKDF-Expand(major-secret, bin_str6, iv_length);
	1949	+bin_str5 = BinConcat(key_length, Version, "key", null);
	1950	+bin_str6 = BinConcat(iv_length, Version, "iv", null);
	1951	+```
	1952	+
	1953	+The provided 64-bit message counter will be XOR'd with the IV to produce the message IV. The Secure SPDM standard requires the counter endianness flag to be little, but big endian is also supported to aid in compatibility with some implementations.
	1954	+
	1955	+Note that it is critical that the same CMK and counter never be used more than once when encrypting or decrypting in SPDM mode as doing so could compromise the plaintext of the messages.
	1956	+
	1957	+For the update and final operations, there are not any SPDM-specific commands; `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_UPDATE` and `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_FINAL` should be used.
	1958	+
	1959	+Command Code: `0x434D_5345` ("CMSE")
	1960	+
	1961	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_SPDM_ENCRYPT_INIT` input arguments
	1962	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1963	+\| ------------------ \| ------------------ \| --------------------------------- \|
	1964	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1965	+\| spdm version \| u8 \| The value should be equal to the \|
	1966	+\|\|\| byte representation of the SPDM \|
	1967	+\|\|\| version, e.g., 0x13 = SPDM 1.3 \|
	1968	+\| counter endianness \| u8 \| XOR the counter with the IV using \|
	1969	+\|\|\| the given endianness. \|
	1970	+\|\|\| 0 = Little endian (standard) \|
	1971	+\|\|\| 1 = Big endian \|
	1972	+\| reserved \| u8[2] \| Reserved \|
	1973	+\| counter \| u8[8] \| 8-byte counter in little-endian \|
	1974	+\|\|\| format that is XOR'd into the IV \|
	1975	+\| CMK \| CMK \| CMK of the key to use to encrypt \|
	1976	+\| aad size \| u32 \|\|
	1977	+\| aad \| u8[aad size] \| Additional authenticated data \|
	1978	+
	1979	+
	1980	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_SPDM_ENCRYPT_INIT` output arguments
	1981	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	1982	+\| -------------- \| ------------------- \| -------------------------------- \|
	1983	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	1984	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	1985	+\| context \| AES_GCM_CONTEXT \|\|
	1986	+
	1987	+
	1988	+Unlike in the standard AES GCM encrypt init command, the IV is not returned.
	1989	+
	1990	+The encrypted and authenticated context's internal structure will be the same as for described in [CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_INIT](#CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_INIT).
	1991	+
	1992	+### CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_UPDATE
	1993	+
	1994	+This continues an AES computation started by `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_INIT` or from another `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_UPDATE`.
	1995	+
	1996	+The context MUST be passed in from `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_INIT` or `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_UPDATE`.
	1997	+
	1998	+Command Code: `0x434D_4755` ("CMGU")
	1999	+
	2000	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_UPDATE` input arguments
	2001	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2002	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| ---------------- \|
	2003	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2004	+\| context \| AES_GCM_CONTEXT \|\|
	2005	+\| plaintext size \| u32 \| MUST be non-zero \|
	2006	+\| plaintext \| u8[plaintext size] \| Data to encrypt \|
	2007	+
	2008	+
	2009	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_UPDATE` output arguments
	2010	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2011	+\| -------------- \| ------------------- \| ------------------------------- \|
	2012	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2013	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2014	+\| context \| AES_GCM_CONTEXT \|\|
	2015	+\| cipertext size \| u32 \| could be greater than plaintext by 16 bytes \|
	2016	+\| ciphertext \| u8[ciphertext size] \|\|
	2017	+
	2018	+
	2019	+### CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_FINAL
	2020	+
	2021	+This finalizes the computation of the AES GCM encryption and produces the final ciphertext and tag.
	2022	+
	2023	+The context MUST be passed in from `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_INIT` or `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_UPDATE`.
	2024	+
	2025	+Command Code: `0x434D_4746` ("CMGF")
	2026	+
	2027	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_FINAL` input arguments
	2028	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2029	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| --------------- \|
	2030	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2031	+\| context \| AES_GCM_CONTEXT \|\|
	2032	+\| plaintext size \| u32 \| MAY be 0 \|
	2033	+\| plaintext \| u8[plaintext size] \| Data to encrypt \|
	2034	+
	2035	+
	2036	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_ENCRYPT_FINAL` output arguments
	2037	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2038	+\| -------------- \| ------------------- \| -------------------------------- \|
	2039	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2040	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2041	+\| tag \| u8[16] \|\|
	2042	+\| cipertext size \| u32 \| could be greater than plaintext by 16 bytes \|
	2043	+\| ciphertext \| u8[ciphertext size] \|\|
	2044	+
	2045	+
	2046	+The tag returned will always be 16 bytes. Shorter tags can be constructed by truncating.
	2047	+
	2048	+### CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_INIT
	2049	+
	2050	+Starts an AES-256-GCM decryption computation.
	2051	+
	2052	+Currently only supports AES-256-GCM with a 96-bit IV.
	2053	+
	2054	+Additional authenticated data (AAD) can only be passed during the `INIT` command, so is limited to the maximum cryptographic mailbox data size (4096 bytes).
	2055	+
	2056	+The AAD and IV must match what was passed and returned from the encryption operation.
	2057	+
	2058	+The CMK must have been created for AES usage.
	2059	+
	2060	+Command Code: `0x434D_4449` ("CMDI")
	2061	+
	2062	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_INIT` input arguments
	2063	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2064	+\| --------------- \| ------------ \| -------------------------------- \|
	2065	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2066	+\| reserved \| u32 \| Reserved \|
	2067	+\| CMK \| CMK \| CMK to use for decryption \|
	2068	+\| iv \| u8[12] \|\|
	2069	+\| aad size \| u32 \|\|
	2070	+\| aad \| u8[aad size] \| Additional authenticated data \|
	2071	+
	2072	+
	2073	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_INIT` output arguments
	2074	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2075	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| ------------------------- \|
	2076	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2077	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2078	+\| context \| AES_GCM_CONTEXT \|\|
	2079	+
	2080	+
	2081	+The encrypted and authenticated context's internal structure will be the same as for encryption.
	2082	+
	2083	+### CM_AES_SPDM_GCM_DECRYPT_INIT
	2084	+
	2085	+Starts an AES-256-GCM decryption computation in SPDM mode.
	2086	+
	2087	+Currently only supports AES-256-GCM with a 96-bit IV.
	2088	+
	2089	+Additional authenticated data (AAD) can only be passed during the `INIT` command, so is limited to the maximum cryptographic mailbox data size (4096 bytes).
	2090	+
	2091	+The AAD must match what was passed and returned from the encryption operation.
	2092	+
	2093	+The CMK must have been created for HMAC usage.
	2094	+
	2095	+The CMK passed in should be the SPDM major secret CMK created for HMAC usage. The key and IV used for encryption shall follow the [SPDM 1.4](https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/dsp0274) section 12.7 derivation with `key_length` 256 and `iv_length` 96.
	2096	+
	2097	+```
	2098	+EncryptionKey = HKDF-Expand(major-secret, bin_str5, key_length);
	2099	+IV = HKDF-Expand(major-secret, bin_str6, iv_length);
	2100	+bin_str5 = BinConcat(key_length, Version, "key", null);
	2101	+bin_str6 = BinConcat(iv_length, Version, "iv", null);
	2102	+```
	2103	+
	2104	+The provided 64-bit message counter will be XOR'd with the IV to produce the message IV. The Secure SPDM standard requires the counter endianness flag to be little, but big endian is also supported to aid in compatibility with some implementations.
	2105	+
	2106	+Note that it is critical that the same CMK and counter never be used more than once when encrypting or decrypting in SPDM mode as doing so could compromise the plaintext of the messages.
	2107	+
	2108	+Command Code: `0x434D_5344` ("CMSD")
	2109	+
	2110	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_SPDM_DECRYPT_INIT` input arguments
	2111	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2112	+\| ------------------ \| ------------------ \| --------------------------------- \|
	2113	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2114	+\| spdm version \| u8 \| The value should be equal to the \|
	2115	+\|\|\| byte representation of the SPDM \|
	2116	+\|\|\| version, e.g., 0x13 = SPDM 1.3 \|
	2117	+\| counter endianness \| u8 \| XOR the counter with the IV using \|
	2118	+\|\|\| the given endianness. \|
	2119	+\|\|\| 0 = Little endian (standard) \|
	2120	+\|\|\| 1 = Big endian \|
	2121	+\| reserved \| u8[2] \| Reserved \|
	2122	+\| counter \| u8[8] \| 8-byte counter in little-endian \|
	2123	+\|\|\| format that is XOR'd into the IV \|
	2124	+\| CMK \| CMK \| CMK to use for decryption \|
	2125	+\| aad size \| u32 \|\|
	2126	+\| aad \| u8[aad size] \| Additional authenticated data \|
	2127	+
	2128	+
	2129	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_SPDM_DECRYPT_INIT` output arguments
	2130	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2131	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| ------------------------- \|
	2132	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2133	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2134	+\| context \| AES_GCM_CONTEXT \|\|
	2135	+
	2136	+
	2137	+The encrypted and authenticated context's internal structure will be the same as for encryption.
	2138	+
	2139	+### CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_UPDATE
	2140	+
	2141	+This continues an AES computation started by `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_INIT` or from another `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_UPDATE`.
	2142	+
	2143	+The context MUST be passed in from `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_INIT` or `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_UPDATE`.
	2144	+
	2145	+Command Code: `0x434D_4455` ("CMDU")
	2146	+
	2147	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_UPDATE` input arguments
	2148	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2149	+\| --------------- \| ------------------- \| ---------------- \|
	2150	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2151	+\| context \| AES_GCM_CONTEXT \|\|
	2152	+\| ciphertext size \| u32 \| MUST be non-zero \|
	2153	+\| ciphertext \| u8[ciphertext size] \| Data to decrypt \|
	2154	+
	2155	+
	2156	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_UPDATE` output arguments
	2157	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2158	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| ------------------------- \|
	2159	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2160	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2161	+\| context \| AES_GCM_CONTEXT \|\|
	2162	+\| plaintext size \| u32 \| MAY be 0 \|
	2163	+\| plaintext \| u8[plaintext size] \|\|
	2164	+
	2165	+
	2166	+### CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_FINAL
	2167	+
	2168	+This finalizes the computation of the AES GCM decryption and produces the final ciphertext.
	2169	+
	2170	+The context MUST be passed in from `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_INIT` or `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_UPDATE`.
	2171	+
	2172	+Tags between 0 and 16 bytes are supported but must be passed (on the right) with zeroes to 16 bytes.
	2173	+
	2174	+The caller MUST verify that the tag verified field is set to 1 before using the result.
	2175	+
	2176	+Command Code: `0x434D_4446` ("CMDF")
	2177	+
	2178	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_FINAL` input arguments
	2179	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2180	+\| --------------- \| ------------------- \| --------------------------------- \|
	2181	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2182	+\| context \| AES_GCM_CONTEXT \|\|
	2183	+\| tag size \| u32 \| Can be 8, 9, ..., 16 \|
	2184	+\| tag \| u8[16] \| Right-padded with zeroes \|
	2185	+\| ciphertext size \| u32 \| MAY be 0 \|
	2186	+\| ciphertext \| u8[ciphertext size] \| Data to decrypt \|
	2187	+
	2188	+
	2189	+Table: `CM_AES_GCM_DECRYPT_FINAL` output arguments
	2190	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2191	+\| -------------- \| ------------------ \| ------------------------------------ \|
	2192	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2193	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2194	+\| tag verified \| u32 \| 1 if tags matched, 0 if they did not \|
	2195	+\| plaintext size \| u32 \| MAY be 0 \|
	2196	+\| plaintext \| u8[plaintext size] \|\|
	2197	+
	2198	+
	2199	+### CM_ECDH_GENERATE
	2200	+
	2201	+This computes the first half of an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman exchange to compute an ephemeral shared key pair with another party.
	2202	+
	2203	+Currently only supports the NIST P-384 curve.
	2204	+
	2205	+The returned context must be passed to the `CM_ECDH_FINISH` command. The context contains the (encrypted) secret coefficient.
	2206	+
	2207	+The returned exchange data format is the concatenation of the x- and y-coordinates of the public point encoded as big-endian integers, padded to 48 bytes each.
	2208	+
	2209	+Command Code: `0x434D_4547` ("CMEG")
	2210	+
	2211	+Table: `CM_ECDH_GENERATE` input arguments
	2212	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2213	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| -------------------- \|
	2214	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2215	+
	2216	+
	2217	+Table: `CM_ECDH_GENERATE` output arguments
	2218	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2219	+\| ------------- \| -------- \| ------------------------------------- \|
	2220	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2221	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2222	+\| context \| u8[76] \| Used as the input to `CM_ECDH_FINISH` \|
	2223	+\| exchange data \| u8[96] \| i.e., the public point \|
	2224	+
	2225	+
	2226	+Table: `CM_ECDH_GENERATE` / `CM_ECDH_FINISH` internal context
	2227	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2228	+\| ------------------ \| -------- \| --------------- \|
	2229	+\| Secret coefficient \| u8[48] \|\|
	2230	+
	2231	+
	2232	+The encrypted context size (76 bytes) is the size of the internal context (48 bytes) plus as 12-byte IV and a 16-byte authentication tag.
	2233	+
	2234	+### CM_ECDH_FINISH
	2235	+
	2236	+This computes the second half of an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman exchange.
	2237	+
	2238	+Currently only supports the NIST P-384 curve.
	2239	+
	2240	+The context must be passed from the `CM_ECDH_GENERATE` command.
	2241	+
	2242	+The incoming exchange data MUST be the concatenation of the x- and y- coordinates of the other side's public point, encoded as big-endian integers, padded to 48 bytes each.
	2243	+
	2244	+The produced shared secret is 384 bits.
	2245	+
	2246	+Command Code: `0x434D_4546` ("CMEF")
	2247	+
	2248	+Table: `CM_ECDH_FINISH` input arguments
	2249	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2250	+\| ---------------------- \| -------- \| -------------------------------------------------------- \|
	2251	+\| chksum \|\|\|
	2252	+\| context \| u8[76] \| This MUST come from the output of the `CM_ECDH_GENERATE` \|
	2253	+\| key usage \| u32 \| usage tag of the kind of key that will be output \|
	2254	+\| incoming exchange data \| u8[96] \| the other side's public point \|
	2255	+
	2256	+
	2257	+The context used as an input is the same as the output context from `CM_ECDH_GENERATE` above.
	2258	+
	2259	+Table: `CM_ECDH_FINISH` output arguments
	2260	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2261	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| ------------------------------- \|
	2262	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2263	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2264	+\| output CMK \| CMK \| Output CMK of the shared secret \|
	2265	+
	2266	+
	2267	+
	2268	+### CM_RANDOM_STIR
	2269	+
	2270	+This allows additional entropy to be added to the underlying deterministic random bit generator, if the hardware is using a CSRNG DRBG.
	2271	+
	2272	+Command Code: `0x434D_5253` ("CMRS")
	2273	+
	2274	+Table: `CM_RANDOM_STIR` input arguments
	2275	+
	2276	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2277	+\| ---------- \| -------------- \| --------------- \|
	2278	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2279	+\| input size \| u32 \|\|
	2280	+\| input \| u8[input size] \|\|
	2281	+
	2282	+
	2283	+Table: `CM_RANDOM_STIR` output arguments
	2284	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2285	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| ------------------------- \|
	2286	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2287	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2288	+
	2289	+
	2290	+### CM_RANDOM_GENERATE
	2291	+
	2292	+This generates random bytes that are returned from the internal RNG.
	2293	+
	2294	+Command Code: `0x434D_5247` ("CMRG")
	2295	+
	2296	+Table: `CM_RANDOM_GENERATE` input arguments
	2297	+
	2298	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2299	+\| ------------------- \| -------- \| --------------- \|
	2300	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2301	+\| data size to return \| u32 \|\|
	2302	+
	2303	+
	2304	+
	2305	+Table: `CM_RANDOM_GENERATE` output arguments
	2306	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2307	+\| ----------- \| --------------- \| ------------------------- \|
	2308	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2309	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2310	+\| output size \| u32 \| size of output \|
	2311	+\| output \| u8[output size] \|\|
	2312	+
	2313	+
	2314	+### CM\_DERIVE\_STABLE\_KEY
	2315	+
	2316	+Derives an HMAC key that has a stable value across resets from either
	2317	+IDevId or LDevId.
	2318	+
	2319	+The (interior) value of the returned CMK will be the stable across resets as it is derived indirectly from the IDevId or LDevId CDIs.
	2320	+The actual encrypted bytes of the CMK will not be the same, and
	2321	+the encrypted CMK itself cannot be used across resets. So, the key
	2322	+will always need to be re-derived after every cold reset.
	2323	+
	2324	+If a key usage other than HMAC is desired, then the KDF or HKDF
	2325	+mailbox functions can be used to derive a key from the returned CMK.
	2326	+
	2327	+Note that in Caliptra 2.0 in subsystem mode, derived stable keys, their derivatives, and commands using them will be marked with a FIPS status of invalid since the UDS and FE cannot be completely zeroized.
	2328	+
	2329	+Command Code: `0x434D_4453` ("CMDS")
	2330	+
	2331	+Table: `CM_DERIVE_STABLE_KEY` input arguments
917	2332
918	2333	\| Name \| Type \| Description
919	2334	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
920	2335	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian. \|
921		-
922		-
923		-Table: `GET_IDEVID_CSR` output arguments
	2336	+\| key_type \| u32 \| Source key to derive the stable key from. 0x0000_0001: IDevId <br> 0x0000_0002: LDevId \|
	2337	+\| info \| u8[32] \| Data to use in the key derivation. \|
	2338	+
	2339	+
	2340	+Table: `CM_DERIVE_STABLE_KEY` output arguments
	2341	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	2342	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	2343	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
	2344	+\| cmk \| CMK \| CMK that stores the stable key material \|
	2345	+
	2346	+
	2347	+### CM_IMPORT
	2348	+
	2349	+Imports the specified key and returns a CMK for it.
	2350	+
	2351	+Usage information is required so that the key can be verified and used appropriately.
	2352	+
	2353	+Note that it is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the source
	2354	+key material meets FIPS requirements, such as zeroization.
	2355	+
	2356	+Command Code: `0x434D_494D` ("CMIM")
	2357	+
	2358	+Table: `CM_IMPORT` input arguments
	2359	+
	2360	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2361	+\| ---------- \| -------------- \| --------------------------------------- \|
	2362	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2363	+\| key usage \| u32 \| Tag to specify how the data can be used \|
	2364	+\| input size \| u32 \| This MUST agree with the key usage \|
	2365	+\| input \| u8[input size] \|\|
	2366	+
	2367	+
	2368	+Table: `CM_IMPORT` output arguments
	2369	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2370	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| --------------------------- \|
	2371	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2372	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2373	+\| CMK \| CMK \| CMK containing imported key \|
	2374	+
	2375	+
	2376	+### CM_DELETE
	2377	+
	2378	+Deletes the object stored with the given mailbox ID.
	2379	+
	2380	+Command Code: `0x434D_444C` ("CMDL")
	2381	+
	2382	+Table: `CM_DELETE` input arguments
	2383	+
	2384	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2385	+\| -------- \| -------- \| --------------- \|
	2386	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2387	+\| CMK \| CMK \| CMK to delete \|
	2388	+
	2389	+
	2390	+Table: `CM_DELETE` output arguments
	2391	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2392	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| ------------------------- \|
	2393	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2394	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2395	+
	2396	+
	2397	+### CM_CLEAR
	2398	+
	2399	+The entire contents of the CMK storage is wiped. All known keys will be invalidated.
	2400	+
	2401	+Command Code: `0x434D_434C` ("CMCL")
	2402	+
	2403	+`CM_CLEAR` takes no input arguments.
	2404	+
	2405	+Table: `CM_CLEAR` output arguments
	2406	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2407	+\| ----------- \| -------- \| ------------------------- \|
	2408	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2409	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2410	+
	2411	+
	2412	+### CM_STATUS
	2413	+
	2414	+Queries the status cryptographic mailbox system.
	2415	+
	2416	+The usage storage records the number of entries used and total for for usage tracking.
	2417	+Usage tracking is only currently implemented for AES, so this is is effectively the number of AES keys used and total potential available AES keys.
	2418	+
	2419	+Command Code: `0x434D_5354` ("CMST")
	2420	+
	2421	+`CM_STATUS` takes no input arguments.
	2422	+
	2423	+Table: `CM_STATUS` output arguments
	2424	+\| Name \| Type \| Description \|
	2425	+\| ------------------- \| -------- \| ------------------------------------ \|
	2426	+\| chksum \| u32 \|\|
	2427	+\| fips_status \| u32 \| FIPS approved or an error \|
	2428	+\| used usage storage \| u32 \| CMK usage storage (in entries) \|
	2429	+\| total usage storage \| u32 \| Total CMK usage storage (in entries) \|
	2430	+
	2431	+
	2432	+
	2433	+### GET\_IDEV\_ECC384\_CSR
	2434	+
	2435	+Command Code: `0x4944_4352` ("IDCR")
	2436	+
	2437	+Table: `GET_IDEV_ECC384_CSR` input arguments
	2438	+
	2439	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	2440	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	2441	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian. \|
	2442	+
	2443	+
	2444	+Table: `GET_IDEV_ECC384_CSR` output arguments
924	2445	\| Name \| Type \| Description
925	2446	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
926	2447	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
927	2448	\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field. \|
928		-\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded IDevID certificate signing request. \|
929		-
930		-
931		-The `mfg_flag_gen_idev_id_csr` manufacturing flag MUST have been set to generate a CSR.
932		-
933		-When called from ROM, if the CSR was not previously provisioned this command will return `FW_PROC_MAILBOX_UNPROVISIONED_CSR(0x0102000A)`.
934		-
935		-When called from runtime, if the CSR was not previously provisioned this command will return `RUNTIME_GET_IDEV_ID_UNPROVISIONED(0x000E0051)`. If the ROM did not support CSR generation, this command will return `RUNTIME_GET_IDEV_ID_UNSUPPORTED_ROM(0x000E0052)`.
936		-
937		-
938		-
939		-When the `mfg_flag_gen_idev_id_csr` flag has been set, the SoC MUST wait for the `flow_status_set_idevid_csr_ready` bit to be set by Caliptra. Once set, the SoC MUST clear the `mfg_flag_gen_idev_id_csr` flag for Caliptra to progress.
940		-
941		-### GET\_FMC\_ALIAS\_CSR
942		-
943		-Command Code: `0x464D_4352` ("FMCR")
944		-
945		-Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_CSR` input arguments
	2449	+\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded ECC384 IDevID certificate signing request. \|
	2450	+
	2451	+
	2452	+### GET\_IDEV\_MLDSA87\_CSR
	2453	+
	2454	+Command Code: `0x4944_4d52` ("IDMR")
	2455	+
	2456	+Table: `GET_IDEV_MLDSA87_CSR` input arguments
946	2457
947	2458	\| Name \| Type \| Description
948	2459	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
949	2460	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian. \|
950	2461
951	2462
952		-Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_CSR` output arguments
	2463	+Table: `GET_IDEV_MLDSA87_CSR` output arguments
953	2464	\| Name \| Type \| Description
954	2465	\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
955	2466	\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
956	2467	\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field. \|
957		-\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded FMC ALIAS certificate signing request. \|
958		-
959		-
960		-The FMC Alias CSR is generated unconditionally on every cold boot.
	2468	+\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded MLDSA87 IDevID certificate signing request. \|
	2469	+
	2470	+
	2471	+The `mfg_flag_gen_idev_id_csr` manufacturing flag MUST have been set to generate a CSR.
	2472	+
	2473	+When called from ROM, if the CSR was not previously provisioned this command will return `FW_PROC_MAILBOX_UNPROVISIONED_CSR(0x0102000A)`.
	2474	+
	2475	+When called from runtime, if the CSR was not previously provisioned this command will return `RUNTIME_GET_IDEV_ID_UNPROVISIONED(0x000E0051)`. If the ROM did not support CSR generation, this command will return `RUNTIME_GET_IDEV_ID_UNSUPPORTED_ROM(0x000E0052)`.
	2476	+
	2477	+When the `mfg_flag_gen_idev_id_csr` flag has been set, the SoC MUST wait for the `flow_status_set_idevid_csr_ready` bit to be set by Caliptra. Once set, the SoC MUST clear the `mfg_flag_gen_idev_id_csr` flag for Caliptra to progress.
	2478	+
	2479	+### GET\_FMC\_ALIAS\_ECC384\_CSR
	2480	+
	2481	+Command Code: `0x464D_4352` ("FMCR")
	2482	+
	2483	+Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_ECC384_CSR` input arguments
	2484	+
	2485	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	2486	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	2487	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian. \|
	2488	+
	2489	+
	2490	+Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_ECC384_CSR` output arguments
	2491	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	2492	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	2493	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
	2494	+\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field. \|
	2495	+\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded ECC384 FMC Alias certificate signing request. \|
	2496	+
	2497	+
	2498	+### GET\_FMC\_ALIAS\_MLDSA87\_CSR
	2499	+
	2500	+Command Code: `0x464d_4452` ("FMDR")
	2501	+
	2502	+Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_MLDSA87_CSR` input arguments
	2503	+
	2504	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	2505	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	2506	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other input arguments, computed by the caller. Little endian. \|
	2507	+
	2508	+
	2509	+Table: `GET_FMC_ALIAS_MLDSA87_CSR` output arguments
	2510	+\| Name \| Type \| Description
	2511	+\| -------- \| -------- \| ---------------
	2512	+\| chksum \| u32 \| Checksum over other output arguments, computed by Caliptra. Little endian. \|
	2513	+\| data\_size \| u32 \| Length in bytes of the valid data in the data field. \|
	2514	+\| data \| u8[...] \| DER-encoded MLDSA87 FMC Alias certificate signing request. \|
	2515	+
961	2516
962	2517	### SIGN\_WITH\_EXPORTED\_ECDSA
963	2518
964	2519	Command Code: `0x5357_4545` ("SWEE")
965	2520
966		-Note: This command is only available in the locality of the PL0 PAUSER.
	2521	+Note: This command is only available in the locality of the PL0 PAUSER.
967	2522
968	2523	Table: `SIGN_WITH_EXPORTED_ECDSA` input arguments
969	2524
@@ -989,7 +2544,7 @@
989	2544
990	2545	Command Code: `5256_4348` ("RVCH")
991	2546
992		-Note: This command is only available in the locality of the PL0 PAUSER.
	2547	+Note: This command is only available in the locality of the PL0 PAUSER.
993	2548
994	2549	Table: `REVOKE_EXPORTED_CDI_HANDLE` input arguments
995	2550
@@ -1001,14 +2556,14 @@
1001	2556
1002	2557	The `exported_cdi` can be created by calling `DeriveContext` with the `export-cdi` and `create-certificate` flags.
1003	2558
1004		-The `exported_cdi_handle` is no longer usable after calling `REVOKE_EXPORTED_CDI_HANDLE` with it. After the `exported_cdi_handle`
	2559	+The `exported_cdi_handle` is no longer usable after calling `REVOKE_EXPORTED_CDI_HANDLE` with it. After the `exported_cdi_handle`
1005	2560	has been revoked, a new exported CDI can be created by calling `DeriveContext` with the `export-cdi` and `create-certificate` flags.
1006	2561
1007	2562	### REALLOCATE\_DPE\_CONTEXT\_LIMITS
1008	2563
1009	2564	Command Code: '5243_5458` ("RCTX")
1010	2565
1011		-Note: This command is only available in the locality of the PL0 PAUSER.
	2566	+Note: This command is only available in the locality of the PL0 PAUSER.
1012	2567
1013	2568	Table: `REALLOCATE_DPE_CONTEXT_LIMITS` input arguments
1014	2569
@@ -1033,7 +2588,7 @@
1033	2588
1034	2589	## Checksum
1035	2590
1036		-For every command except for FW_LOAD, the request and response feature a checksum. This
	2591	+For every command except for FIRMWARE_LOAD, the request and response feature a checksum. This
1037	2592	mitigates glitches between clients and Caliptra.
1038	2593
1039	2594	The checksum is a little-endian 32-bit value, defined as:
@@ -1058,10 +2613,11 @@
1058	2613
1059	2614	Table: FIPS status codes
1060	2615
1061		-\| Name \| Value \| Description
1062		-\| ------- \| ----- \| -----------
1063		-\| `FIPS_APPROVED` \| `0x0000_0000` \| Status of command is FIPS approved
1064		-\| `RESERVED` \| `0x0000_0001 - 0xFFFF_FFFF` \| Other values reserved, will not be sent by Caliptra
	2616	+\| Name \| Value \| Description \|
	2617	+\| --------------- \| --------------------------- \| --------------------------------------------------- \|
	2618	+\| `FIPS_APPROVED` \| `0x0000_0000` \| Status of command is FIPS approved \|
	2619	+\| `RESERVED` \| `0x0000_0001 - 0xFFFF_FFFF` \| Other values reserved, will not be sent by Caliptra \|
	2620	+
1065	2621
1066	2622	## Runtime Firmware updates
1067	2623
@@ -1070,7 +2626,7 @@
1070	2626
1071	2627	### Applying updates
1072	2628
1073		-A Runtime Firmware update is triggered by the `CALIPTRA_FW_LOAD` command. Upon
	2629	+A Runtime Firmware update is triggered by the `FIRMWARE_LOAD` command. Upon
1074	2630	receiving this command, Runtime Firmware does the following:
1075	2631
1076	2632	1. Locks the mailbox to writes
@@ -1096,10 +2652,10 @@
1096	2652
1097	2653	1. Validate DPE state in SRAM
1098	2654	1. Ensure the TCI tree is well-formed
1099		- 1. Ensure all nodes chain to the root (TYPE = RTMR, “Internal TCI” flag is set)
	2655	+ 1. Ensure all nodes chain to the root (TYPE = RTJM, “Internal TCI” flag is set)
1100	2656	1. Verify that the “Latest TCI” field of the TCI Node that contains the
1101		- Runtime PCRs (TYPE = RTMR, “Internal TCI” flag is set) matches the
1102		- “Latest” and Journey Runtime PCR values.
	2657	+ Runtime Journey PCR (TYPE = RTJM, “Internal TCI” flag is set) matches the
	2658	+ “Latest” Runtime PCR value from PCRX
1103	2659	1. Ensure `SHA384_HASH(0x00..00, TCI from SRAM) == RT_FW_JOURNEY_PCR`
1104	2660	1. Check that retired and inactive contexts do not have tags
1105	2661	1. If any validations fail, Runtime Firmware executes the
@@ -1119,14 +2675,14 @@
1119	2675	is denoted in the signed Caliptra firmware image. The PL0 PAUSER may call any
1120	2676	supported DPE commands. Only PL0 can use the CertifyKey command. Success of the
1121	2677	CertifyKey command signifies to the caller that it is at PL0. Only PL0 can use
1122		- the POPULATE\_IDEV\_CERT mailbox command.
	2678	+ the POPULATE\_IDEV\_ECC384\_CERT and POPULATE\_IDEV\_MLDSA87\_CERT mailbox commands.
1123	2679	* PL1 - Restricted privilege. All other PAUSERs in the SoC are PL1. Caliptra
1124	2680	SHALL fail any calls to the DPE CertifyKey with format=X509 by PL1 callers.
1125	2681	PL1 callers should use the CSR format instead.
1126	2682
1127	2683	PAUSER and Locality map 1:1. Consequently, only the single DPE Client associated
1128		-with PL0 level, is authorized to invoke CertifyKey DPE command with format=x509.
1129		-All other DPE Clients have instead restricted privileges associated to PL1 (as
	2684	+with PL0 level, is authorized to invoke CertifyKey DPE command with format=x509.
	2685	+All other DPE Clients have instead restricted privileges associated to PL1 (as
1130	2686	described above).
1131	2687
1132	2688	#### PAUSER privilege level active context limits
@@ -1159,15 +2715,16 @@
1159	2715	The DPE iRoT profile leaves some choices up to implementers. This section
1160	2716	describes specific requirements for the Caliptra DPE implementation.
1161	2717
1162		-\| Name \| Value \| Description
1163		-\| ---- \| ----- \| -----------
1164		-\| Profile Variant \| `DPE_PROFILE_IROT_P384_SHA384` \| The profile variant that Caliptra implements.
1165		-\| KDF \| SP800-108 HMAC-CTR \| KDF to use for CDI (tcg.derive.kdf-sha384) and asymmetric key (tcg.derive.kdf-sha384-p384) derivation.
1166		-\| Simulation Context Support \| Yes \| Whether Caliptra implements the optional Simulation Contexts feature.
1167		-\| Supports ExtendTci \| Yes \| Whether Caliptra implements the optional ExtendTci command.
1168		-\| Supports Auto Init \| Yes \| Whether Caliptra will automatically initialize the default DPE context.
1169		-\| Supports Rotate Context \| Yes \| Whether Caliptra supports the optional RotateContextHandle command.
1170		-\| CertifyKey Alias Key \| Caliptra Runtime Alias Key \| The key that will be used to sign certificates that are produced by the DPE CertifyKey command.
	2718	+\| Name \| Value \| Description \|
	2719	+\| -------------------------- \| ------------------------------ \| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \|
	2720	+\| Profile Variant \| `DPE_PROFILE_IROT_P384_SHA384` \| The profile variant that Caliptra implements. \|
	2721	+\| KDF \| SP800-108 HMAC-CTR \| KDF to use for CDI (tcg.derive.kdf-sha384) and asymmetric key (tcg.derive.kdf-sha384-p384) derivation. \|
	2722	+\| Simulation Context Support \| Yes \| Whether Caliptra implements the optional Simulation Contexts feature. \|
	2723	+\| Supports ExtendTci \| Yes \| Whether Caliptra implements the optional ExtendTci command. \|
	2724	+\| Supports Auto Init \| Yes \| Whether Caliptra will automatically initialize the default DPE context. \|
	2725	+\| Supports Rotate Context \| Yes \| Whether Caliptra supports the optional RotateContextHandle command. \|
	2726	+\| CertifyKey Alias Key \| Caliptra Runtime Alias Key \| The key that will be used to sign certificates that are produced by the DPE CertifyKey command. \|
	2727	+
1171	2728
1172	2729	### Supported DPE commands
1173	2730
@@ -1176,7 +2733,7 @@
1176	2733	* GetProfile
1177	2734	* InitializeContext
1178	2735	* DeriveContext
1179		- * Note: The "export-cdi" flag is only available in the locality of the PL0 PAUSER.
	2736	+ * Note: The "export-cdi" flag is only available in the locality of the PL0 PAUSER.
1180	2737	* CertifyKey
1181	2738	* Caliptra DPE supports two formats for CertifyKey: X.509 and PKCS#10 CSR.
1182	2739	X.509 is only available to PL0 PAUSERs.
@@ -1201,9 +2758,9 @@
1201	2758
1202	2759	* Runtime Firmware SHALL initialize the default context in “internal-cdi” mode.
1203	2760	* Perform the following initial measurements:
1204		- * Call DeriveContext with Caliptra RT PCRs
	2761	+ * Call DeriveContext with Caliptra Journey PCR
1205	2762	* INPUT\_DATA = PCRX (RT journey PCR as defined in the FHT)
1206		- * TYPE = “RTMR”
	2763	+ * TYPE = “RTJM”
1207	2764	* CONTEXT\_HANDLE = default context
1208	2765	* TARGET\_LOCALITY = Caliptra locality (0xFFFFFFFF)
1209	2766	* Call DeriveContext with mailbox valid PAUSERS
@@ -1248,12 +2805,13 @@
1248	2805
1249	2806	### Internal representation of TCI nodes
1250	2807
1251		-\| Byte offset \| Bits \| Name \| Description
1252		-\| ----- \| ---- \| ---------------- \| -----------------------------------------------------
1253		-\| 0x00 \| 383:0 \| `TCI_CURRENT` \| Current TCI measurement value
1254		-\| 0x30 \| 383:0 \| `TCI_CUMULATIVE` \| TCI measurement value
1255		-\| 0x60 \| 31:0 \| `TYPE` \| `TYPE` parameter to the DeriveContext call that created this node
1256		-\| 0x64 \| 31:0 \| `LOCALITY` \| `TARGET_LOCALITY` parameter to the DeriveContext call that created this node (PAUSER)
	2808	+\| Byte offset \| Bits \| Name \| Description \|
	2809	+\| --------------- \| -------- \| ---------------- \| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \|
	2810	+\| 0x00 \| 383:0 \| `TCI_CURRENT` \| Current TCI measurement value \|
	2811	+\| 0x30 \| 383:0 \| `TCI_CUMULATIVE` \| TCI measurement value \|
	2812	+\| 0x60 \| 31:0 \| `TYPE` \| `TYPE` parameter to the DeriveContext call that created this node \|
	2813	+\| 0x64 \| 31:0 \| `LOCALITY` \| `TARGET_LOCALITY` parameter to the DeriveContext call that created this node (PAUSER) \|
	2814	+
1257	2815
1258	2816	### Certificate generation
1259	2817
@@ -1261,7 +2819,7 @@
1261	2819
1262	2820	The DPE `GET_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN` command shall return the following certificates:
1263	2821
1264		-* IDevID (optionally added by the SoC via POPULATE\_IDEV\_CERT)
	2822	+* IDevID (optionally added by the SoC via POPULATE\_IDEV\_ECC384\_CERT)
1265	2823	* LDevID
1266	2824	* FMC Alias
1267	2825	* Runtime Alias

Changes to Runtime Specification