Caliptra SPDM VDM Commands

Overview

This document describes how Caliptra common commands are transported over SPDM Vendor Defined Messages (VDM) via MCTP. This is the out-of-band (OOB) path for standard, vendor-neutral Caliptra device management commands that require SPDM-defined semantics, SPDM authorization, or SPDM streaming/chunking.

For command definitions (categories, payloads, and completion codes), see Caliptra Common Commands.

For the unified software architecture shared between OOB (SPDM VDM) and in-band (MCI Mailbox) paths, see Unified Caliptra Command Handling.

Transport Stack

┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│        Caliptra VDM Commands            │
│ (FirmwareVersion, ExportAttestedCsr, …) │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│      Caliptra Command Header            │
│     (Command Version, Command Code)     │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│        OCP SPDM VDM Framing             │
│     (IANA Registry ID, Vendor ID)       │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│              SPDM                       │
│     (VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST/RESPONSE)   │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│              MCTP                       │
│        (Message Type 0x05)              │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│         Physical Layer                  │
│              (I3C)                      │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘

SPDM VDM Encapsulation

Caliptra commands assigned to SPDM VDM are carried within SPDM VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST and VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE messages using the OCP-assigned Vendor ID (42623). The command range 0x01-0x20 is reserved in the OCP registry and defined by the Caliptra Working Group.

OCP VDM Header

The SPDM VDM standard header identifies the vendor organization:

FieldSizeValueDescription
Standard ID2 bytes0x0004IANA Enterprise ID format
Vendor ID Length1 byte0x04Length of the Vendor ID field (4 bytes)
Vendor ID (IANA)4 bytes0x0000A67FOCP Caliptra Working Group IANA Enterprise Number

Caliptra VDM Message Header

Following the OCP VDM standard header, the Caliptra-specific message header appears:

FieldSizeDescription
Command Version1 byteProtocol version. Current value: 0x01
Command Code1 byteIdentifies the command (see Command List)

Response Format

Responses follow the same header structure. The Command Code in the response mirrors the request. The response payload begins with a CaliptraCompletionCode (1 byte) indicating success or failure. Command-specific response data, if any, follows the completion code:

FieldSizeDescription
Command Version1 byte0x01
Command Code1 byteSame as request command code
Completion Code1 byteOCP completion code (0x00 = Success)
PayloadN bytesCommand-specific response data

See Completion Codes for the full list of error codes.

The SPDM VDM completion code is transport-specific response status and is not included in the transport-agnostic common response payload tables.

Command Codes

The following table maps SPDM VDM command codes to Caliptra common commands. For command payload definitions, see Caliptra Common Commands.

These command codes are assigned from the Caliptra range reserved in the OCP command registry.

Command CodeCommand NameR/ODescription
0x05GetAttestationORetrieve signed attestation evidence in a requester-selected format.
0x06RequestDebugUnlockORequest debug unlock in production environment.
0x07AuthorizeDebugUnlockTokenOSend debug unlock token to device for authorization.
0x08ExportAttestedCsrOExport attested CSR for a Caliptra device identity key.
0x11DeviceOwnershipTransferOCarry DOT commands with native authentication.
0x12AuthorizedCommandOCarry challenge-authorized provisioning and fuse subcommands.

R = Required, O = Optional

Implemented commands are advertised in the external_commands field returned by DeviceCapabilities. Implemented operations under AuthorizedCommand are advertised individually in authorized_subcommands. Recognized but unimplemented commands are not advertised. See Device Capabilities.

Authorization-Gated Subcommands

The following subcommands are assigned to the SPDM VDM IANA authorization-gated path and are carried under AuthorizedCommand. Multi-byte payload integers and the subcommand ID are encoded little-endian on the wire.

Subcommand IDNameStatusDescription
0x4D41_4343 (MACC)GetAuthChallengeSupportedAcquire a one-use 48-byte authorization challenge.
0x5056_504B (PVPK)ProvisionVendorPkHashSupportedProvision vendor public key hash.
0x504F_504B (POPK)ProvisionOwnerPkHashSupportedProvision owner public key hash.
0x4D43_4D53 (MCMS)FuseIncreaseCaliptraMinSvnSupportedIncrease Caliptra minimum SVN.
0x4D43_4650 (MCFP)ProgramFieldEntropySupportedProgram field entropy.
0x4D52_564B (MRVK)FuseRevokeVendorPubKeySupportedRevoke vendor public key.
0x5256_4B48 (RVKH)FuseRevokeVendorPkHashSupportedRevoke vendor public key hash.
0x4946_504B (IFPK)FuseLockPartitionSupportedLock fuse partition.
0x0000_0011DeviceOwnershipTransferSupportedCarry authorization-gated DOT subcommands.

Authorization Flow

  1. Send GetAuthChallenge with an empty subcommand payload. The successful response data is a 48-byte challenge.
  2. Serialize the target subcommand payload exactly as listed below, excluding the common authorization trailer.
  3. Sign subcommand_id(BE) || payload || challenge with both the authorized ECC P-384 and ML-DSA-87 keys. The signed command ID is big-endian even though the AuthorizedCommand wire field is little-endian.
  4. Append the common authorization trailer and submit the complete request under AuthorizedCommand.

For ordinary authorized subcommands, subcommand_id is the FourCC shown in the table. For DOT, subcommand_id is the family ID 0x00000011; the signed payload is DOT_FourCC(LE) || DOT_payload. Thus both MCI and SPDM verify the same preimage:

0x00000011(BE) || DOT_FourCC(LE) || DOT_payload || challenge

The common authorization trailer is:

nonce[48] || ecc_pub_x[48] || ecc_pub_y[48] || mldsa_pub[2592] || HybridSignature

nonce echoes the challenge. HybridSignature is ecc_sig_r[48] || ecc_sig_s[48] || mldsa_sig[4628]. The challenge is consumed by the verification attempt and cannot be reused. Requests must have the exact documented size; missing, truncated, and oversized trailers are rejected with InvalidPayloadSize, while failed authorization returns AccessDenied.

Implemented Subcommand Payloads

Byte offsets below begin immediately after the four-byte subcommand_id and include the complete authorization trailer.

SubcommandBytesFieldEncoding
PVPK0:3slotu32, little-endian
4:51hashu8[48]
52:99nonceu8[48]
100:147ecc_pub_xu8[48]
148:195ecc_pub_yu8[48]
196:2787mldsa_pubu8[2592]
2788:7511signatureHybridSignature
POPK0:47hashu8[48], dword-reversed OTP representation
48:95nonceu8[48]
96:143ecc_pub_xu8[48]
144:191ecc_pub_yu8[48]
192:2783mldsa_pubu8[2592]
2784:7507signatureHybridSignature
MCMS0:3flagsu32, little-endian; must be zero
4:7svnu32, little-endian
8:55nonceu8[48]
56:103ecc_pub_xu8[48]
104:151ecc_pub_yu8[48]
152:2743mldsa_pubu8[2592]
2744:7467signatureHybridSignature
MCFP0:3partitionu32, little-endian
4:51nonceu8[48]
52:99ecc_pub_xu8[48]
100:147ecc_pub_yu8[48]
148:2739mldsa_pubu8[2592]
2740:7463signatureHybridSignature
MRVK0:3reservedu32, little-endian; must be zero
4:7slotu32, little-endian
8:11key_typeu32, little-endian
12:15key_indexu32, little-endian
16:63nonceu8[48]
64:111ecc_pub_xu8[48]
112:159ecc_pub_yu8[48]
160:2751mldsa_pubu8[2592]
2752:7475signatureHybridSignature
RVKH0:3reservedu32, little-endian; must be zero
4:7slotu32, little-endian
8:55nonceu8[48]
56:103ecc_pub_xu8[48]
104:151ecc_pub_yu8[48]
152:2743mldsa_pubu8[2592]
2744:7467signatureHybridSignature
IFPK0:3partitionu32, little-endian
4:51nonceu8[48]
52:99ecc_pub_xu8[48]
100:147ecc_pub_yu8[48]
148:2739mldsa_pubu8[2592]
2740:7463signatureHybridSignature

Device Ownership Transfer Commands

Runtime DOT commands use a common four-byte subcommand namespace under family ID 0x11. Multi-byte fields are little-endian.

Authorization-gated DOT request:

[version=1][command=0x12][family=0x11:u32][DOT FourCC:u32]
[DOT payload][authorization trailer]

Native-authenticated/read-only DOT request:

[version=1][command=0x11][DOT FourCC:u32][DOT payload]
FourCCCommandPathDOT payloadValidation
MDLKLockAuthorized`cak[48]
MDDSDisableAuthorizedlak_hash[48]Nonzero LAK hash; EVEN state
MDRTRotateAuthorized`min_fuse_count:u32
MDBBGet backup blobAuthorizedEmptyODD state and valid blob HMAC
MDUCUnlock challengeNativeEmptyODD state and valid current blob
MDULUnlockNativeLAK ECC key, ML-DSA key, hybrid signatureExisting LAK hash and challenge signatures
MDSTStatusNative/read-onlyEmptyReturns `enabled:u8
MDRCRecoveryNativeDOT_BLOB[168]ODD state and current-epoch blob HMAC
DOTWOverride challengeNativeRecovery ECC key and ML-DSA keyKeys match fused recovery-key hash
DOTXOverrideNativeRecovery keys and hybrid signatureFused key hash and challenge signatures

MDLK, MDDS, MDRT, and MDBB are rejected with AccessDenied when sent directly under top-level command 0x11. Recovery-mode gating for MDRC, DOTW, and DOTX is deferred; their native cryptographic and state checks are always enforced.

For detailed command flows, state transitions, security properties, and use cases, see Device Ownership Transfer (DOT).